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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the nationwide movement for school finance reform has
been deeply connected with school desegregation.' In the late 1960s and early
1970s, advocates of equal educational opportunity who were growing frustrated
with the slow progress of school desegregation began to seek out new avenues
of reform.2 Many turned to school finance reform and the goal of equalizing
resources as a fresh way to improve the educational opportunities of poor or
minority students. Today, as federal district courts around the country declare
unitary status in school desegregation cases3 while battles over school finance
continue to rage,4 it would seem that the shift from school desegregation to
school finance litigation is almost complete.
Connecticut complicates that story, as advocates of equal educational
opportunity have continued to press for both desegregation and school finance
reform, often on behalf of different constituencies of students. While
Connecticut witnessed a successful school finance suit in the late 1970s,
t J.D., Yale Law School, 2004. The author is grateful for the time of those who agreed to be
interviewed for this Essay, for the comments and encouragement of Professor James Ryan, Tom
Saunders, and Steve Fuzesi, and for the editorial assistance of Ethan Fletcher and Jamie Ginott.
1. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 253-55 (1999); see also
Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School
Finance Litigation, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL
EQUITY 88, 102 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
2. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 253.
3. In the 1990s, courts closed desegregation cases in numerous cities, including Buffalo, see Arthur
v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112, 119 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Denver, see Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic
Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1308 (D. Colo. 1995); Oklahoma City, see Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 778 F.
Supp. 1144, 1196 (W.D. Okla. 1991), aff'd, 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir. 1993); Savannah, see Stell v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 1994); and Wilmington, see Coalition to Save Our
Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784, 785 (D. Del. 1995), aff'd90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996).
Courts have issued "exit plans" in other cities. See Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1157, 1157-58 (2000).
4. For a list of pending cases, see James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on
School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 463, 464
n. 14 (2004).
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Horton v. Meskill,5 some advocates never gave up on desegregation and the
integrative vision of equality underlying it. In the late 1980s, plaintiffs brought
suit under the state constitution challenging the de facto racial and socio-
economic segregation of the Hartford public schools. The filing of Sheff v.
O'Neill6 made clear that more than increased funding was needed for urban
students to achieve equality of educational opportunity.
7
Though many in the state turned their attention to Sheff and racial
desegregation during the 1990s, others remained focused on monetary
resources. Filed in 1998, Johnson v. Rowland sought to ensure that the mandate
of Horton v. Meskill continued to be enforced and that students in school
districts with low or moderate property wealth received an adequate education.
8
Though the case was withdrawn in 2003, in turning back to school finance
litigation as a way of achieving equal educational opportunity, Johnson
highlighted important questions about the efficacy of desegregation efforts and
the relationship between desegregation and school finance litigation.
This Essay seeks to understand why Connecticut has followed an
alternating path between school finance and desegregation litigation, what that
path reveals about the goals and limitations of each type of litigation, and how
the two approaches to achieving equality of educational opportunity interact
when pursued alongside one another.
Parts I, II, and III examine Connecticut's three major cases. Each Part
explores the conditions that necessitated bringing suit, the goals the plaintiffs
pursued, how the litigation unfolded, and the lessons to be learned from how
the State responded to each case. Each of the suits became necessary because
without the pressure of litigation, there was insufficient political will to remedy
the problems each sought to address. But even as they relied on the same
provisions of the Connecticut Constitution to support their claims for equal
educational opportunity, the suits targeted different problems. While Horton
and Johnson focused on the amount of state funding afforded to school
districts, Sheff sought to reduce the racial isolation of the Hartford public
schools. Though Horton and Sheff had different goals, given the opportunity to
devise a remedy, state actors responded to the suits in a strikingly similar way:
They sought to "buy" equality.
The remedies the General Assembly enacted conformed to the political and
budgetary realities of the times, even if they departed to some extent from how
the court identified the constitutional infirmity in each case. After Horton, this
5. Horton v. Meskill (Horton 1), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
6. Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
7. See James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529,
532 (1999).
8. Johnson v. Rowland, No. CV-98-0492103-S (Conn. Super. Ct., filed Mar. 26, 1998). The
complaint in Johnson was withdrawn on October 7, 2003.
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meant directing more money toward urban districts even as major disparities
remained between plaintiffs suburban school district and wealthier districts.
After Sheff, it meant targeting state dollars toward improving the quality of
urban education and building new magnet schools, even though the
Connecticut Supreme Court identified the way school district lines were drawn
as the single greatest factor contributing to racial isolation.9 In this way,
remedying a desegregation suit became as much about spending state dollars as
shuffling students. By "buying" desegregation, the State put pressure on the
education budget and created a trade-off between responding to Sheff and
fixing a distorted school finance formula. A new round of school finance
litigation ensued when plaintiffs filed suit in Johnson.
Part IV explores the significance of the State's "purchase" of the Sheff
remedy and the resulting competition between addressing the educational ills of
the racially isolated urban poor and providing adequate state funding for
property-poor municipalities throughout the state. Though advocates of school
finance reform and desegregation both aim to achieve equal educational
opportunity, in some cases they employ different means and work to help
different children. To the extent that finite dollars are needed to solve both
problems, however, one vision of equal educational opportunity may be traded
for another. Which one should yield is a profoundly difficult and consequential
question.
Before turning to these theoretical issues, we begin with Connecticut's first
school finance case, Horton v. Meskill.
I. HORTON V. MESKILL
The first of Connecticut's three major education cases was a school finance
equity suit. 10 In a state that relied heavily on local property taxes rather than
state monies to fund education, and where property wealth among school
districts varied dramatically, property-poor school districts could not provide
the same educational resources to their students as wealthier school districts.
Horton v. Meskill challenged the balance between state and local education
funding. It did not address the racial isolation of the State's urban areas, nor did
it focus on the poor achievement levels of some Connecticut students compared
to others. Nevertheless, the remedy the political branches devised yielded
financial gains for the cities, especially Hartford. 1 That these financial benefits
9. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1274.
10. In the traditional typology of school finance cases, Horton v. Meskill (Horton 1), 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977), falls most neatly into the "second wave" of cases during which plaintiffs challenged the
equity of state school finance systems under state constitutions' equal protection and education clauses.
See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity
to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1995) (explaining the wave metaphor).
11. See Douglas S. Reed, Democracy v. Equality: Legal and Political Struggles over School
Finance Equalization 104, 111 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the
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were not enough to avert the need for Sheff raises questions about the
limitations of school finance litigation. At the same time, by shifting funding
toward needy urban schools, the legislature's response to Horton provides an
early glimpse of how a combination of political expediency and limited
resources can yield a trade-off between increasing funding for urban education
and promoting equity across school districts statewide.
A. An Early Lesson in Political Will
When Wesley Horton brought suit against state officials in 1974, the state's
school finance system was ripe for a lawsuit. During the 1970s, local property
taxes in Connecticut made up approximately 70% of school funding, while the
State contributed only about 20-25%. 12 By comparison, nationwide, local
governments paid an average of 51% of school funding, while states covered
41 %.13 The State's meager contribution to education in Connecticut came in the
form of a flat grant of only about $250 per pupil. 14 This meant that state
funding played no role in equalizing expenditures between property-rich and
property-poor towns. Regardless of how wealthy a school district was, it
received the same amount of state funds per pupil as its neighbor. A study by
the National Education Finance Project ranked Connecticut last among the fifty
states in the equalizing impact of its state aid.'
5
The State's failure to provide more aid led to massive disparities in school
district expenditures. In the 1972-1973 school year, while suburban
Greenwich-then the wealthiest town in Connecticut-had $156,564 in
property wealth per pupil, rural Sterling-the poorest town-had only $17,441
per pupil. 16 That same year, Greenwich spent $1,429 per pupil, while Sterling
Yale Law School Library). While the shift of fimds to predominantly minority urban schools after
Horton can be explained by political factors, it is admittedly somewhat unusual. Indeed, it is often
difficult for minority districts to persuade legislatures to enact effective school finance remedies even
when the minority districts themselves win school finance suits. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of
Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REv. 432, 458-63 (1999). That the Connecticut legislature
passed school finance reform that benefited urban districts when a white suburban district brought suit
speaks to the powerful role that the governor's political agenda played in shaping the Horton remedy.
See infra Section I.D.
12. Horton 1, 376 A.2d at 366. The remaining five percent of funding came from the federal
government. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 369. Connecticut may have relied more heavily on property taxes than other states at this
time in part because it did not have an income tax until the early 1980s. Cf Stephen C. Tracy, School
Finance Reform in Connecticut: The Role of a State Education Agency in the Policy Making Process
19-20 (1984) (unpublished Ed.D dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Yale Law School
Library).
15. See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1322 (1972).
16. DONNA E. SHALALA ET AL., EQUALIZING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN CONNECTICUT:
REPORT TO THE CONNECTICUT COMMISSION TO STUDY SCHOOL FINANCE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL




spent $709 per pupil.17 Meanwhile, Sterling residents were taxing themselves at
a rate nearly four times that of Greenwich residents.18
The disparities arose for several reasons. First, then and now, Connecticut
school district lines for the most part tracked town lines.' 9 In a system that
relies heavily on property taxes to fund education, inequalities in town wealth
will manifest themselves in unequal school district expenditures. Indeed, the
wealth and characteristics of Connecticut's towns and cities varied dramatically
in the 1970s, as they do today. Former Commissioner of Education Gerald
Tirozzi used to speak of "the two Connecticuts, separate and unequal. You had
affluent Connecticut, and you had the poor urban and rural districts." 20
Tirozzi's depiction oversimplified Connecticut's demography in some
important ways. For example, it failed to take account of suburban towns that
were not affluent and had weak property tax bases.22 Nevertheless, Tirozzi's
characterization captured two important elements of the state's demography.
First, the term "separate" reflected the racial segregation between the cities on
the one hand, and the suburbs and rural areas on the other.23 Second, the word
17. Id. at 15 tbl.3.
18. Id. at 29 tbl.7, 30.
19. There are 166 school districts in Connecticut. See LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW AND
INVESTIGATIONS COMM., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM,
24 n.2 (2002), available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/pri/archives/2001psreport.htm [hereinafter LPRIC
REPORT]. Of these districts, only seventeen are regional, meaning that they encompass from two to six
towns. Id. Regional school districts generally arise where towns have too few students to have their own
school. In Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1274 (Conn. 1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court
identified the 1909 law making town and school district lines co-terminus, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-
240 (2003), as the primary cause of de facto segregation in Connecticut. Insofar as school district
funding was determined almost entirely by town wealth before Horton, it seems that the same law also
contributed heavily to inequality in school finance.
20. Telephone Interview with Gerald Tirozzi, former Commissioner of Education, State of
Connecticut, now Executive Director, National Association of Secondary School Principals (Dec. 16,
2002) [hereinafter Tirozzi Interview].
21. Today, "the two [Connecticuts] is closer to three or four or five, but the two are still very real."
Interview with Theodore Sergi, former Commissioner of Education, Connecticut, in Hartford, Conn.
(Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Sergi Interview]. At the time the interview was conducted, Sergi was still
the Commissioner of Education for Connecticut; he has since retired. Sergi provided the following
rough typology of Connecticut's towns and cities, breaking down the state into five categories: (1)
affluent suburbs, concentrated largely in southwestern Connecticut's Fairfield County; (2) cities like
Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport with high concentrations of poverty; (3) "run-down mill towns"
of Northeastern Connecticut with low to medium property-wealth; (4) property-poor rural areas,
especially in Northwestern Connecticut; and (5) "inner-ring suburbs" like West Hartford, Bloomfield,
Hamden and Stratford, that are experiencing population shifts as they become more racially and
ethnically diverse and less wealthy.
22. For example, Canton, the suburb of Hartford where Wesley Horton lived when he brought
Horton v. Meskill, had far less property wealth than Darien, which could spend much more on school
funding. See Horton I, 376 A.2d at 368. Tirozzi's model oversimplified in another way as well: by
failing to distinguish between types of poverty. For example, even though Connecticut's cities had the
highest concentration of impoverished individuals, the cities themselves were not necessarily property
poor. See Note, supra note 15, at 1328 ("[T]he 'poor' tend to live in districts which are actually
'wealthier' in terms of commercial and industrial property.").
23. The racial dynamics of Connecticut will be discussed at greater length below in Section II.A.
Today, while the cities remain predominantly minority, many suburbs, especially "inner-ring" suburbs
surrounding cities, are becoming increasingly racially diverse. See Mike Swift & Robert A. Frahm, The
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"unequal" captured the disparities that existed in a state that still today has,
among other communities, some extremely wealthy suburbs (especially those
in Fairfield County in the southwestern comer of the state), several
impoverished cities (especially Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport), and
numerous property-poor rural communities and mill towns (especially in
northwestern and northeastern Connecticut).
State officials were hardly unaware of the disparate expenditures among
Connecticut's school districts. In the early 1970s, several state-sponsored
reports detailed the disparities and called for change. 24 Moreover, state officials
had been sued on at least three occasions before Horton v. Meskill in challenges
to the school finance system.25
Despite such widespread awareness of the problem, the governor and
legislature did little in the years leading up to Horton I to reform the system of
school finance. In 1975, a year after Horton I was filed, the General Assembly
adopted a more equitable guaranteed tax base (GTB) formula on top of the flat
grant, but the change was merely symbolic. 26 It was not until after the supreme
court decision in Horton I that the political branches finally acted to reform
Connecticut's school finance system.
B. The Horton Litigation
In 1977, the Connecticut Supreme Court forced the legislature to face the
inequities in the state's system of school finance when it declared the system
unconstitutional under the state constitution. 27 Wesley Horton, a lawyer, school
board member, and father, brought suit against Governor Meskill and other
state officials on behalf of his son Bamaby, a kindergartener in the Canton
public schools. 28 At the time, Canton was a small "bedroom community for
Suburbs Are Not as White as When Lawsuit Was Filed, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 1996, at A12.
24. See FINANCING CONNECTICUT'S SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY
SCHOOL FINANCE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY i (1975); SHALALA ET AL., supra note 16; 2
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON TAX REFORM, THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON TAX
REFORM 53 (1972).
25. Unlike Horton v. Meskill, these suits were brought in federal court and none of them succeeded.
At least two of the suits, Jelliffe v. Berdon, 345 F. Supp. 773 (D. Conn. 1972), and Peebles v. Sanders,
referenced in INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY SCHOOL FINANCE AND EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (1974), appear to have been either dismissed or withdrawn by the
plaintiffs after the Supreme Court held that inequality in school finance did not violate the federal Equal
Protection Clause. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). A third suit,
Athanson v. Grasso, 411 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Conn. 1976), which was brought by City Council members
in Hartford, was dismissed on grounds of standing.
26. The new formula was funded at such a low amount that in 1975-76, eligible towns received
only $12.50 per pupil in aid above the flat grant amount. CONN. STATE BD. OF EDUC. & CONN. SCH. FIN.
ADVISORY PANEL, A PLAN FOR PROMOTING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN CONNECTICUT 22
(1979).
27. Horton v. Meskill (Horton I), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
28. In reality, it was a junior colleague of Horton's named Maurice FitzMaurice who filed the
motions, tried the case, and argued the appeal, as Horton did not think it appropriate for him to do so
when his son was the named plaintiff. See Wesley W. Horton, Memoirs of a Connecticut School Finance
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Hartford," which had become "relatively depressed" after the town's main
industries moved abroad.29 It had little property wealth with which to fund its
schools. Canton was almost entirely white.
30
Horton filed a short complaint in state court in 1974, alleging that the
existing school finance system violated the federal equal protection clause,
3 1
the state constitution's equal protection clauses, 32 and the state constitution's
education clause. 33 According to the complaint, the state's reliance on local
property taxes, combined with Canton's comparatively low tax base, meant that
Canton could not provide the same educational services as wealthier towns and
could not compete effectively for teachers.
34
Horton's overall litigation strategy was to "keep it simple." 35 This strategy
manifested itself in two important ways. First, typical of other early school
finance cases, Horton focused exclusively on disparities in monetary inputs. In
this way, his was purely a claim of inequality in funding, not inadequacy in
student achievement. 36 Thus, at trial, Horton sought to "compare apples and
apples"; 37 he called to the witness stand the superintendent of Canton and the
superintendent of another predominantly white-but wealthy-suburban school
district to testify to the size of their respective budgets.
38
Second, Horton sought to keep the cities out of the lawsuit by convincing
Hartford and others not to intervene, at least at the trial stage.39 In Horton's
words, "The general principle that the Connecticut Constitution has something
to say about school finance had to be decided first. ''40 In part, Horton wanted to
Lawyer, 24 CONN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1992). However, it is clear that Horton himself was at all times the
driving force behind the suit. See id.
29. Interview with Wesley Horton, Partner, Horton, Shields & Knox, in Hartford, Conn. (Dec. 10,
2002) [hereinafter Horton Interview].
30. In 1978-79, for example, Canton's population was only 1.5% minority. 2 CONN. STATE BD. OF
EDUC., THE CONDITION OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN CONNECTICUT,
FIsCAL YEAR 1978-1979, at 42 (1980).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. CONN. CONST. art. I, § I ("All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no
man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.");
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to
segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of
religion, race, color, ancestry, or national origin.").
33. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary and secondary
schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.")
34. Second Substituted Complaint at 2, Horton v. Meskill, 332 A.2d 113 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974)
(No. 185283) (complaint filed Sept. 4, 1974).
35. Horton, supra note 28, at 707.
36. While the differences in inputs were "dramatic," Horton considered outputs such as academic
achievement "hard to measure" and worried that the evidence of a relationship between inputs and
outputs would have been hard to prove. Horton Interview, supra note 29.
37. See Horton, supra note 28, at 708.
38. See id. at 707.
39. While the cities did not intervene at the trial stage, they did ultimately intervene when Horton
challenged the legislature's remedy. See Horton v. Meskill (Horton II), 445 A.2d 579 (Conn. 1982).
40. Horton, supra note 28, at 709 n.13.
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avoid the issue of municipal overburden, which threatened to muddy the
relationship between property wealth and expenditures. 41 More pertinently, he
wanted to avoid the issue of race. "I saw Hartford as being a race issue,"
Horton explained in an interview. "And why do you want to mix up race with
school finance constitutionally? ' 42 While he did not envision Sheff v. O'Neill
per se, he imagined a race-related suit sometime down the road that could
contend with the problems of racial isolation in the cities.43
Horton's desire not to "mix up" race and school finance helps explain why
the plaintiffs in Sheffultimately found the conception of equality of educational
opportunity in Horton I wanting. 4 While focusing on money could alleviate
problems of financial disparities, it could not address the realities of racial
isolation. Horton recognized the trade-off he was making in focusing on
disparities in wealth between property-rich and property-poor suburban school
districts but believed that the principle that school funding should be equalized
was not only important in and of itself, but also would be a useful predicate for
a later suit addressing urban racial isolation.
45
46The Horton trial lasted four weeks, and the plaintiffs prevailed. Judge Jay
Rubinow held that there was no violation of the federal equal protection
clause,47 but that the defendants had violated both the state education clause
and the state equal protection clauses. The existing school finance system ran
afoul of the education clause because a system that yields "disparities in
educational opportunity" is, by definition, not based on "appropriate
legislation. ' 48 It violated the state equal protection clauses because the
education clause established education as a fundamental right, and defendants
had failed to proffer a compelling interest that could justify the violation of that
right.49
In a four-to-one vote, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed on direct
appeal, approving of the trial court's reasoning. Rather than ordering a
41. Id. at 707 n. 10. Municipal overburden refers to the problem that cities often encounter of not
having sufficient funds to pay for the many services they must provide on a large scale, including police,
fire, and sanitation. In the context of school finance, the existence of municipal overburden often means
that even where cities appear to have high property values and thus large amounts of funds for
education, they actually have insufficient funds because their money must go to funding other municipal
services. This appears to have been the case in Connecticut prior to the Horton litigation, as documented
in Note, supra note 15, at 1329.
42. Horton Interview, supra note 29.
43. Id.
44. See infra Part I1.
45. Horton Interview, supra note 29.
46. 332 A.2d 113 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
47. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. Horton, 332 A.2d. at 118. See supra note 33 for the text of the education clause.
49. Id. at 118-19. The trial court explicitly ruled that fostering local control of public schools was
not a compelling interest. Id.
50. See Horton I, 376 A.2d at 372-74.
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specific remedy, the court deferred to the General Assembly to develop a
solution, finding that this duty was the "proper function of the legislative
department" and was assigned to the legislature by the education clause.
51
While the court did not recommend a particular solution, it noted that the
constitution did not require total state financing of education, the abandonment
of local control, or bringing all schools to the level of the highest-spending
district.52 In short, the constitution required a system that was more equal but
not completely equal.
C. The State's Response and Subsequent Litigation
Following the supreme court decision, the School Finance Advisory Panel
(SFAP), a group representing the Commissioner of Education, members of the
General Assembly, members of the State Department of Education, and other
officials, set to work developing a remedy to the state constitutional violations
identified in Horton 1.53 Relying heavily on SFAP's recommendations, the
General Assembly ultimately passed responsive legislation in 1979. Public Act
79-128 established a revised GTB formula, the full funding of which would be
phased in over five years, a minimum expenditure requirement (MER) to
ensure that towns did not absorb all of the new state funds in the form of tax
relief, and a sliding scale based on a town's property wealth for funding of
special education and transportation. 54 Initially, Horton did not challenge the
legislation: "It was long on words and short on money. But it was a good start
and we saw little reason to create friction immediately after passage. 55
However, Connecticut underwent a period of fiscal crisis in the early 1980s,
and the General Assembly quickly began amending Public Act 79-128 to lower
the State's education costs and delay full implementation of the GTB formula. 56
In a series of ten bills passed between 1980 and 1984, the General Assembly
chipped away at the legislation, providing an early indication of the difficulty
of sustaining political will for increases in state education aid when faced with
tight economic conditions.5 7
51. Id. at374-75.
52. Id. at 375-76.
53. For a detailed discussion of the composition of SFAP and its political machinations, see Tracy,
supra note 14, at 48-65.
54. An Act Concerning Equalization of Educational Financing and Equity in Educational
Opportunity, Pub. Act 79-128, 1979 Conn. Acts 99 (Reg. Sess.) (codified in scattered sections of CONN.
GEN. STAT. tit. 10). The new GTB formula was based on the product of a town's property wealth, tax
effort, and need, as measured by indicators of the individual wealth of a town's residents. For a more
detailed description of the legislation, see CONN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., ACCESS TO EXCELLENCE 1980-
1985, at 2 (1980). The legislation did not eliminate the $250 per pupil flat grant as a minimum state
expenditure for each town, but the effect of the GTB formula was to ensure that many cities and towns
received far more than $250 per pupil.
55. Horton, supra note 28, at 717.
56. DOUGLASS. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS 80 (2001); Reed, supra note 11, at 131-41.
57. For more on the General Assembly's changes, see Reed, supra note 11, at 140. Section Il.C,
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Because of these amendments, Horton returned to court in 1980 seeking
compliance with the supreme court's mandate. When the trial court finally
58heard the case in 1984, Judge Arthur Spada upheld the constitutionality of the
GTB formula, but found the recent amendments unconstitutional. On appeal,
the supreme court affirmed the constitutionality of the GTB formula, but
remanded to the trial court to reassess the constitutionality of the amendments
under a different standardf 9 Because the formula was finally fully funded in
1986-a time when the Connecticut economy was booming again-the
60plaintiffs did not press for re-hearing by the trial court. Indeed, by the end of
the 1980s, Wesley Horton had shifted his focus to a new suit: Sheffv. O'Neill.
D. Horton's Lessons
In the end, Horton v. Meskill satisfied neither the goals of its expected
beneficiaries-white students in property-poor suburban districts-nor the
needs of its unexpected beneficiaries-minority students in cities like Hartford.
As the executive and legislative branches crafted a politically saleable remedy,
attention shifted from equalizing resources between property-poor and
property-rich suburbs to devoting more resources to urban schools. But as the
later need for the Sheff v. O'Neill lawsuit shows, money alone would not solve
the problems of Hartford's racially isolated students.
Before turning to those critiques, it is important to recognize the case's
accomplishments. Horton forced an apathetic governor and legislature to
confront the school finance problem after years of ignoring compelling
evidence of inequity.6 1 It also ensured that the burden of school finance would
no longer fall as heavily on local school districts. Between 1979-1980 and
1989-1990, the local share of funding dropped from 60.7% to 51.1%, while the
state share rose from 31.7% to 44.7%.62 In one scholar's words, Horton "cut
the Gordian knot of school finance reform in Connecticut. By forcing the
infra, returns to the theme of how economic conditions can affect political will in its discussion of more
recent budgetary constraints.
58. The long delay between filing and when the trial court ruled is due to a series of battles over
towns and cities attempting to intervene in the litigation. See Horton v. Meskill (Horton II), 445 A.2d
579 (Conn. 1982).
59. See Horton v. Meskill (Horton III), 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985). Under the new standard, the
plaintiffs first had to make a prima facie showing that disparities in educational expenditures were more
than de minimis in that the disparities continued to jeopardize the plaintiffs' fundamental right to
education. If they made that showing, the burden would then shift to the state to show that the disparities
advanced a legitimate state policy and were not so great as to "emasculate the goal of substantial
equality." Id.at 1107. Justice Ellen Peters, who would later write the majority opinion in Sheffv. O'Neill,
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), also wrote for the majority in Horton III.
60. See Horton, supra note 28, at 719.
61. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
62. See STATE OF CONN. DEP'T OF EDUC., BUDGET BRIEF 1992-93, at 2 (1991). After 1990,
however, the trend began to reverse. Section III.A, infra, explores that decline. Importantly, the state
share has never fallen below its pre-Horton level.
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legislature to address the issue of school finance reform, the court helped
transform what had been an almost exclusively local issue-the financing of
elementary and secondary education-into a statewide issue." 63 In addition, the
overall amount of funding for education in Connecticut increased dramatically
in the decade-and-a-half after Horton, a fact that may or may not be attributable
to Horton.64 Between 1977 and 1986, the median expenditure on education rose
from $833 to $4,095 per pupil.6
5
At the same time, however, Wesley Horton's central goal of reducing
disparities in expenditures between property-poor and property-rich districts
was barely achieved. Indeed, the level of inequality between districts dropped
by only sixteen percent between 1977 and 1986.66 In the same years, the gap
between the lowest and highest spending districts as measured in absolute
dollars grew significantly.
67
To understand why vast inequalities in expenditures persisted, it is useful to
look to the executive and legislative branches' responses to Horton.68 Douglas
Reed's study of the era attributes the lack of equalization to two factors: weak
political will and extensive deal-making. Rather than committing enough state
funds to property-poor districts so that they could begin to approach the levels
63. Reed, supra note 11, at 80.
64. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Reform, in EQUITY
AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 72, 80-81 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999); James W. Guthrie
& Richard Rothstein, Enabling "'Adequacy" to Achieve Reality: Translating Adequacy into State School
Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 209,212 tbl.7-
1 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). Scholars disagree over how much of this increase to attribute to
Horton, as many states experienced a rise in funding for education in the early to mid-1980s. Compare
Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance and Legal Impact: An Empirical
Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (1995) (declining to attribute the rise in expenditures to
Horton); with Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of
Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 801 (1995) ("Per pupil
expenditures in Connecticut school districts grew at a rate that substantially outpaced the nation as a
whole.").
65. REED, supra note 56, at 25. That the expenditures of the highest spending districts, which did
not benefit from post-Horton legislation, also increased may suggest that Horton cannot account for the
overall growth in education spending. On the other hand, if one believes that some districts want to
continue spending more in order to maintain an advantage for their children in competing for higher
education, as Peter Enrich has suggested, one could argue that higher spending districts increased their
expenditures in order to stay ahead of those who benefited from Horton, and that Horton therefore did
cause the overall pie to expand. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 158 (1995).
66. REED, supra note 56, at 29 (using the Gini coefficient, a common measure of inequality). The
gains may actually have been greater than this figure suggests, however, as real estate inflation in the
1970s and 1980s probably would have made the disparity even greater without the countervailing impact
of the new formula. See Reed, supra note 11, at 164-65.
67. See REED, supra note 56, at 23 fig.2.1.
68. Certainly one might also blame the supreme court, which stated in Horton I that the State did
not have to sacrifice local control or bring all districts up to the level of the highest spending district in
order to meet the court's constitutional mandate. See Horton I, 376 A.2d at 375. One might also be
tempted to attribute the lack of more equalization to towns putting their new school finance money
toward tax relief rather than greater school funding. However, this explanation does not appear to hold
up, as the minimum expenditure requirement (MER) limited the ability of towns to channel school
finance aid into tax relief.
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of their richer neighbors, the executive and legislative branches consistently
tried to keep down the cost of responding to Horton .69
Relying heavily on the work of Stephen Tracy,70 Reed also points to
political bargaining to explain why greater equalization did not occur.
According to Tracy and Reed, Governor Ella Grasso used the supreme court's
mandate to respond to Horton as a way of paying back urban leaders to whom
she owed political favors from the last election. 71 Thus, the GTB formula was
designed to direct significant funds to urban schools, especially in Hartford.72
Grasso appeased the wealthy suburbs by ensuring that every school district
received at least $250 per pupil from the State under the flat grant.73 But with
so much attention paid to the cities and wealthy suburbs, poorer suburbs like
Canton failed to see their own school funding increase dramatically relative to
their wealthier counterparts. Reed concludes, "The political pressures of the
school finance issue turned the reform effort away from equalization and
towards a political distribution of benefits." 74 In this way, the legislative and
executive branches' response to Horton I resulted in a trade-off of funds that
impaired property-poor school districts' efforts to achieve greater parity with
wealthier districts. This is only the first such trade-off we will see.
While Reed offers two explanations for the trade-off, there may be a third:
According to various indicators, students in urban schools were poorer and
therefore needed extra state education aid. Though Canton had little property
wealth, only 2.7% of its students were considered "economically
disadvantaged" by the State's school district profiles for the 1978-79 school
year. 75 By contrast, 75.7% of Hartford's students were given this label.76 To the
extent that there is a correlation between concentrated poverty and educational
need, Hartford students required more state dollars than Canton students to
achieve the same outcomes. Former Commissioner Sergi, who helped
coordinate the State Department of Education's response to Horton from
behind the scenes, explained that the Department's strategy was that "all the
new additional money would go to the places with the greatest need., 77 As
SFAP's recommendations were translated into a legislative response, this
strategy appeared to take hold.
Regardless of what caused the shift in focus, the point remains the same:
69. See Reed, supra note 11, at 131-4 1.
70. Tracy, supra note 14.
71. Id. at 141; Reed, supra note 11, at 104-15.
72. This outcome was achieved by heavily weighting the "need" component of the formula, which
was measured by indicators of individual poverty. See Reed, supra note 11, at 107-08.
73. Reed, supra note 11, at I10-11.
74. Id. at 106.
75. 2 CONN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., supra note 30, at 42.
76. Id. at 118.
77. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
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While Horton v. Meskill was brought to vindicate the rights of white students in
Canton whose schools had less funding than their wealthy suburban
counterparts, once the remedy was in the hands of the legislature, the goal
changed. Theref6re, when asked what core issue Horton addressed, former
Commissioner of Education Tirozzi responded, "the fact that we were under-
funding urban schools in Connecticut."78 That the case is remembered this way
despite its origins in Canton points to the power of the political process to
shape a remedy that suits political, economic, and social realities. Had the
General Assembly strayed too far from the court's mandate, one would have
expected the supreme court to keep it in check. However, the court in Horton
III seemed content to allow the political process to have its way.
79
Though cities benefited financially from Horton, students in urban schools
also may have been harmed by the suit in a different way. Civil rights advocate
Edythe Gaines captured the problem when she wrote in 1980, "[R]ecent
legislative initiatives and vigor with respect to the equity issues of school
finance and education of the handicapped have in no way been matched or even
approached with respect to the issue of equity for racial minorities."80 A lone
voice in the Connecticut education literature of the time, Gaines observed that
the focus on school finance had drawn attention away from the perpetuation of
racial segregation in the cities.
When the Sheffv. O'Neill plaintiffs filed suit in 1989, they took on the issue
that Wesley Horton deliberately avoided in Horton v. Meskill. That Sheff was
necessary despite the fact that the cities received significantly more state
funding as a result of Horton may suggest, as Professor James Ryan has
contended, that school finance litigation, insofar as it focuses exclusively on
increasing expenditures, is "ineffective in improving student achievement" in
high-poverty urban districts. Horton may have produced a more equitable
school finance formula than the flat grant that preceded it, but Sheff reminds us
that school finance litigation aimed at redressing interdistrict disparities in
wealth is not a panacea, especially for students in racially isolated schools. As
John C. Brittain, who was once lead counsel in Sheff explained, "However you
could construe the most maximum success of Horton v. Meskill in equalizing
educational finances and other support for education between rich and poor, it
didn't touch the racial and the ethnic segregation." 82 We turn now to Sheff and
78. Tirozzi Interview, supra note 20.
79. Horton II, 486 A.2d at I 110 (substituting a more deferential standard of review for strict
scrutiny analysis).
80. Edythe L. Gaines, Advancing Equal Educational Opportunity and Access to Quality Integrated
Education in the Public Schools of the State of Connecticut, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONNECTICUT
EDUCATION 67 (1980).
81. Ryan, supra note 7, at 532.
82. Telephone Interview with John C. Brittain, Counsel in Sheffv. O'Neill and currently Professor,
Thurgood Marshall School of Law (Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Brittain Interview]. Since that interview,
Brittain has publicly stated that he is considering abandoning his advocacy of integrated schools in favor
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efforts to address the problem of segregation.
II. SHEFF V. O'NEILL
Even while the Horton remedy was still being litigated in the early 1980s,
others in the state were setting their eyes on a different conception of equal
educational opportunity: desegregation. 83 By 1989, when Brittain's team filed
Sheff v. O'Neill, Hartford's population was 90.5% minority.84 Yet just as the
political branches were slow to respond to school finance inequities before
Horton, it would take a court case for the political branches to contend with the
problem of de facto segregation. And even once the supreme court compelled
them to act, the response not only did little to ameliorate the plaintiffs'
problem, but also deepened the trade-off between directing funds to urban
schools and reducing school funding inequalities statewide.
A. De Facto Segregation in Connecticut Schools: The Historical Context
Like in other Northeastern states, the story of rising de facto segregation in
Connecticut dates to the 1950s, when the cities experienced an influx of
African-Americans and whites fled to the suburbs. 85 As a result of these
changes and other factors,86 some schools in Connecticut's major cities-
Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport-were already predominantly black by
the 1960s.87 The problem of growing racial isolation did not go unnoticed in
this era, however. 88 In 1964, New Haven undertook a mandatory racial balanceprogram,89 and three years later, the General Assembly passed legislation
of investing resources to improve even "one-race, non-white schools." Stan Simpson, An Advocate of
Integration Reconsiders, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 18, 2004, at A l (quoting Brittain). Others involved
in the Sheff litigation, including City Councilwoman Elizabeth Horton Sheff, mother of lead plaintiff
Milo Sheff, have decried Brittain's change in position. As Sheff stated, "If that's John's position for the
record, then John needs to divorce himself from the Sheff case." Id.
83. Then-University of Connecticut law professor John Brittain and others considered bringing a
school desegregation suit in Connecticut in the early 1980s but ultimately decided to wait due to a lack
of popular support for the idea and increasing barriers to bringing federal desegregation suits. Id.
84. Revised Complaint at 10, Sheffv. O'Neill, 1995 WL 230992 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (No. CV
89-0360977S) (complaint filed Nov. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Revised Complaint].
85. See DAVID M. ROTH, CONNECTICUT 209-11(1979).
86. One might also look to exclusionary zoning laws as another reason for the concentration of
minorities in Connecticut's urban centers. See generally Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996). In 1990, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted legislation designed to
combat exclusionary zoning by permitting expedited judicial appeals by any developer of an affordable
housing project. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(f) (2003). For an appraisal of the legislation's efficacy,
see Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Years of Hope, Why
Only Middling Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (2001).
87. ROTH, supra note 85, at 210 (noting that at least one Hartford school was ninety-five percent
black).
88. The United States Civil Rights Commission published a report in the mid-1960s detailing rising
segregation. See Revised Complaint, supra note 84, at 18.
89. The program bused seventh and eighth grade students between predominantly white and
minority schools. It was upheld in Guida v. Board of Education, 213 A.2d 843 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
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creating Project Concern, a voluntary program that bused students from the
three major cities to nearby suburban schools.90
But it was not until the late 1980s-when the issue of school finance was
temporarily settled-that the State Department of Education again took up the
issue of desegregation. In 1988, Commissioner Tirozzi's office issued a
ground-breaking report, which concluded that "[a] trend is developing in
Connecticut's public schools that is causing, according to the dictionary
definition of segregation, the 'isolation of the races.. .' with 'divided
educational facilities.' ' 91 The report included a series of recommendations for
how the legislature could begin to contend with the problem.92 A second report
soon followed.93
Despite their urgent tone, Tirozzi's reports "fell on deaf ears," and thus
"were a little like the initial school finance reports." 94 They had little effect
because, as former Commissioner of Education Sergi explained, "There wasn't
the political will to move them, especially in the Governor's Office." 95 While
the State committed about $2-$3 million to allow districts to develop voluntary
interdistrict plans, the funds were, in Sergi's words, "a drop in the bucket."
96
The State took more substantial action in 1993 with the passage of legislation
requiring communities to participate in a regional planning process to talk
about decreasing segregation.97 Without any enrollment goals, however, the
talks had little practical effect. Like with school finance, it would take a
90. Project Concern continued through the next decades on a very small scale, until it was
subsumed into the Open Choice program following the Sheff decision. At its peak in the mid-1970s,
Project Concern served 1300 students. COMM. ON RACIAL EQUITY, A REPORT ON RACIAL/ETHNIC
EQUITY AND DESEGREGATION IN CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 8 (1988). In addition, in 1969, the
General Assembly passed a law that required school districts to ensure that each school reflected the
racial makeup of its district. An Act Concerning Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools, 1969 Conn.
Pub. Acts 773 (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-226a to 10-226e (2003)). Because this Act
was limited to racial balance within each individual district, it said nothing about the growing
segregation between districts, which Sheffaimed to address.
91. COMM. ON RACIAL EQUITY, supra note 90, at 1.
92. Id. at 11-20. Among the recommendations were: (1) starting with voluntary measures but
empowering the State Board of Education to impose a mandatory plan; (2) making financial incentives
available for voluntary interdistrict plans; (3) having the State Department of Education provide
technical assistance to develop plans; and (4) having the State Department of Education engage in
"broad-based planning with other agencies concerned with housing, transportation and other factors that
contribute to segregation in the public schools." Id. at 19.
93. In 1989, the State Department of Education called for the creation of magnet schools,
interdistrict school construction, and the recruitment of more minority teachers. See CONN. STATE DEP'T
OF EDUC., QUALITY AND INTEGRATED EDUCATION: OPTIONS FOR CONNECTICUT 27, 32 (1989). The
plaintiffs in Sheffrelied on both reports to prove that the State was aware of the problem.
94. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See An Act Improving Educational Quality and Diversity, 1993 Conn. Acts 263 (Reg. Sess.)
(repealed in part 1998); KATHRYN A. MCDERMOTr, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM
VERSUS EQUITY 31-33 (1999); see also EDUC. IMPROVEMENT PANEL, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY iv (1997).
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supreme court decision to force greater change.98
B. The Sheff Litigation
Having abandoned efforts to bring a desegregation suit in the early 1980s,
John Brittain, along with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU, the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation (CCLU), the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense Fund, and others, began anew later in the decade. Invigorated by the
Tirozzi reports, 99 in which the State admitted the existence of severe racial
isolation, Brittain and his "dream team" brought Wesley Horton on board as
local Connecticut counsel and solicited eighteen plaintiffs.100 Most of the
plaintiffs, including fourth-grade lead plaintiff Milo Sheff, were African-
American or Latino/a students from Hartford, but a few were white West
Hartford residents. In April 1989, they filed suit in state court against Governor
O'Neill, Commissioner Tirozzi, and other state officials.
The plaintiffs' original complaint contained five main legal claims, all of
which rested on state constitutional or statutory provisions.' 0 1 The first claim,
and the one on which the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, was what Brittain
described as a "garden variety Brown v. Board of Education school
desegregation claim."' 2 The plaintiffs argued that Hartford's schools were
racially and ethnically segregated and that "[s]eparate educational systems for
minority and non-minority students are inherently unequal."' 0 3 They relied on
the same constitutional provisions that the plaintiffs in Horton had invoked-
the two equal protection provisions (one of which expressly forbids
"segregation"), °4 and the education clause. 0 5 These provisions, the plaintiffs
claimed, outlawed even de facto segregation in Connecticut's schools.
Their second claim was more novel, as it introduced the problem of
concentrated poverty and the notion that there is a link between racial and
socio-economic segregation. Plaintiffs claimed that racial segregation,
98. Interestingly, even the 1993 regional planning legislation can be attributed to Sheff. As former
Commissioner Sergi recalls, Governor Weicker "was watching the Sheff trial on Cable Access TV"
when he decided to call for the State to take action on desegregation in his State of the State address.
Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
99. Brittain Interview, supra note 82 ("When that report hit, everything mushroomed.").
100. Id. at 82.
101. The following formulation of the five claims is influenced by my interview with John Brittain,
during which he laid out the claims and distinguished among them. Id. While the Revised Complaint,
supra note 84, also lays out four counts (the fifth was dropped, as explained infra note 11), Brittain's
oral description clarified the fine differences among them.
102. Brittain Interview, supra note 82. While the goal of Sheff might have echoed that of Brown,
the claims were, of course, different insofar as Shefffocused on de facto, not de jure, segregation.
103. Revised Complaint, supra note 84, at 27.
104. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 20. See supra note 32 for the full text of these provisions. Article
First, § 20, the anti-segregation provision, was added to the constitution during the constitutional
convention of 1965.
105. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. See supra note 33 for the full text of this provision.
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combined with high concentrations of poverty, and the concomitant burdens of
educating students who are socio-economically deprived, rendered Hartford
unable to provide equal educational opportunities, as required by the same three
constitutional provisions. 06
Their third claim again relied on these constitutional provisions, but read as
a school finance claim. Plaintiffs claimed that disparities in both educational
inputs (e.g., facilities, equipment, supplies, and teacher quality) and outputs (as
measured by achievement on standardized tests) between Hartford's schools
and surrounding suburban schools deprived Hartford's students of an equal
educational opportunity and a minimally adequate education. 0 7 The plaintiffs
thus relied on Horton v. Meskill, where the right to equal educational
opportunity had been established, but also moved beyond it to press for a right
to an adequate education.
While this third claim suggests that Sheff was both a school desegregation
and a school finance case, that conclusion misconceives the purpose of the
school finance claims. As Brittain explained, Sheff was always fundamentally
about desegregation, and the school finance claims were simply in service
of the "garden variety" desegregation claim. 1°8 In Brittain's view, forty years
after Brown, it was not enough to show that there was racial isolation; to
convince a court and the public that a constitutional violation was occurring,
one also had to show that there was actual inequality in resources and
achievement. 10 9 This third claim served that purpose. Wesley Horton confirmed
that the school finance claims were "not... serious .... The serious claim was
Equal Protection. That's the one that won." ' 10 The fourth and fifth claims drew
less attention, and one of them was dropped before trial.'11
106. During the 1987-88 school year, 47.6% of Hartford students were on AFDC, 40.9% had
limited English proficiency, and 51% came from a single parent family. Revised Complaint, supra note
84, at 12.
107. See id. at 28-29. While the plaintiffs had a strong adequacy claim given the low achievement
levels of Hartford's students, they faced an uphill battle on the equity claim, because in 1991-92,
Hartford was spending more on education on average than surrounding suburban districts. Ryan, supra
note 7, at 540.
108. Brittain Interview, supra note 82.
109. Brittain used the following example to illustrate why the school finance claims were needed to
bolster the segregation claim:
If Diana Ross, Colin Powell, Julio Inglesias, and others like them lived in Greenwich,
Connecticut... and they all sent their children to the same elementary school and it was
overwhelmingly non-white but equally affluent as they are, would there be any claim of racial
segregation? Perhaps. Would there be any claims of inequality... ? Probably not. Therefore,
we had to show both segregation as well as actual inequality.
Id.
110. Horton Interview, supra note 29.
111. The fourth claim was that plaintiffs were denied equal educational opportunity under CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 10-4a(l) (2003) ("[E]ach child shall have.., equal opportunity to receive a suitable
program of educational experiences."), and the due process clauses of the state constitution, CONN.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 8, 10. The fifth claim alleged that housing segregation by the state had perpetuated
school segregation. Plaintiffs dropped this claim before trial, however, because the State said it would
take too long to prepare discovery. Brittain Interview, supra note 82.
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The Sheff trial lasted thirty-five days in the winter of 1992-1993. When
Judge Harry Hammer finally ruled in 1995, he held for the State on the grounds
that there was no state action. 12 One year later, however, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut reversed the trial court in a narrow, and ground-breaking, 4-3
holding."13 The court first held that Horton I had created "an affirmative
constitutional obligation to provide children in public schools throughout the
state with a substantially equal educational opportunity"--an obligation that the
State had not met since it had not acted to remedy the existence of racial and
ethnic segregation in Hartford's schools.114 Thus, even though Horton itself did
not address the problem of segregation, it provided an indispensable
constitutional precedent for Sheff.
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and quickly
indicated that it needed only to reach the plaintiffs' first claim-the "garden
variety" school desegregation claim-to find a constitutional deprivation."
5
Reading the three constitutional provisions "conjointly," the court concluded
"that the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school
system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportunity
and requires the state to take further remedial measures."" 6 The court reasoned
from the text of the provisions, their history, policy considerations, and
precedent.
Following its approach in Horton I, the court did not impose a remedy, but
rather deferred to the legislative and executive branches to develop a
112. See Sheffv. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 WL 230992, at *29 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
12, 1995). In a baffling unpublished opinion, Judge Hammer rested his legal analysis almost entirely on
the dissenting opinions of Justice Douglas in several federal school desegregation cases. For a critique of
Judge Hammer's reasoning, see Adam Schwartz, Note, Sheff v. O'Neill: Will the "'Constitution State"
Desegregate? 38 How. L.J. 693, 716-21 (1995).
113. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). In the larger context of school desegregation
litigation, the opinion was groundbreaking in numerous ways. Two deserve mention here. First, after
years of firmly established precedent that de facto segregation did not violate the federal Constitution
and was, therefore, effectively untouchable, the Connecticut court found that de facto segregation
violated its own constitution and required a remedy. See Wesley W. Horton & Susan Cormier, 1996
Connecticut Appellate Review, 71 CoNN. B. J. 1 (1997) ("There is no case anywhere in the country like
Sheff."). Second, while Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974), had foreclosed the
possibility of moving students between urban and suburban schools to remedy even de jure segregation,
the Sheffdecision suggested that no such barrier existed under the state constitution. Indeed, the court
found that the "single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and
ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system," was the state's districting statute that established
town boundaries as the dividing line between school districts. Shef, 678 A.2d at 1274. The court seemed
to imply that it was inevitable that students would in some way have to be moved between urban and
suburban areas to remedy the constitutional deprivation.
114. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1277.
115. The court specifically withheld judgment on the second and third claims regarding the effects
of concentrated poverty and the disparities in inputs or outputs. Id. at 1281. Nevertheless, Justice
Berdon, in concurrence, reached the question of whether Hartford's students were receiving an adequate
education and concluded that "a racially and ethnically segregated educational environment also
deprives schoolchildren of an adequate education as required by the state constitution." Id. at 1291
(Berdon, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 1281 (majority opinion).
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solution."l 7 The court provided no guidance as to the contours of an appropriate
remedy; it only required that the political branches "put the search for
appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas."' 1 8 In
leaving it up to the State to respond to Shelf, the court again opened the door
for political factors to shape the remedy.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Borden, joined by two other justices, sharply
rebuked the majority opinion. In his view, the majority had reached
a result driven conclusion based on a theory of constitutional liability that was never
presented to the trial court or to this court, is ungrounded in the text and history of
Connecticut's constitutional provisions regarding the rights to public education and
equal protection of the laws and is wholly at odds with the factual record in this
case. The rm aority's conclusion, moreover, is contrary to the teaching of Horton v.
Meskill....
Scholars have also questioned the majority's reasoning, especially its
justification for reading the three constitutional provisions "conjointly."' 12 In
light of these criticisms and how unexpected the majority opinion was, some
commentators have speculated that the identities of the judges-particularly
Chief Justice Peters-may help explain the result. Sheff was Peters's last major
decision before her September 1996 retirement and some have characterized it
as her "swan song"121_a final opportunity to correct injustice before leaving
her post. 122 Regardless of what ultimately motivated the majority, however, the
State had a constitutional duty after Sheff to take action.
C. The State's Response
Soon after the supreme court's decision, Governor John Rowland issued
Executive Order No. 10, establishing the Educational Improvement Panel to
117. Id. at 1290-91.
118. Id. at 1290. For a critique of the court's failure to specify the defendants' affirmative
obligations under Sheff in greater detail, see Justin R. Long, Comment, Enforcing Affirmative State
Constitutional Obligations and Sheffv. O'Neill, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 277, 309-10 (2002).
119. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1295 (Borden, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., David J. Armor, Facts and Fictions about Education in the Sheff Decision, 29
CONN. L. REv. 981 (1997); Michael Besso, Shelf v. O'Neill: A Research Note, 34 CONN. L. REV. 315
(2002); Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of the Court Decisions in Sheff v. O'Neill and Possible
Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1187 (1997); Ryan, supra note 7, at 544-46.
121. Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1079, 1097 (1997).
122. See Lynne Tuohy, Ruling in Sheff vs. O'Neill Reflects a Clash of Strong Convictions,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 14, 1996, at Al. Tuohy, a knowledgeable observer of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, suggests that Peters's convictions in Sheffmay be rooted in her experience of fleeing
Nazi Germany with her parents: "This landmark ruling is not only authored by her. It is very much about
her." Id. Tuohy quotes Judge Guido Calabresi, a close friend of Peters and himself a refugee of
Mussolini's dictatorship, who, in a tribute to Peters commented, "First and foremost, Ellen Peters is an
immigrant, a refugee .... I think this is a crucial fact. It teaches one always to look to strangers, to those
who are apart, to those who are not always cared for. If you have been a stranger, you look toward doing
justice." Id. Tuohy concludes that in Peters's last major opinion, "the incisive, intellectual analysis that
is her hallmark" gives way to a passion for righting the wrongs done to strangers. Id.
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begin preparing a response to Sheff 123 The Panel was chaired by former
Commissioner Sergi and was composed of education leaders from the
executive and legislative branches, as well as community leaders and interest
groups from around the state. Over the course of five months, the Panel
conducted fourteen meetings, including at least eleven public sessions, before
issuing a report to the Governor and General Assembly.
The Panel's report included fifteen recommendations, the most important of
which involved promoting voluntary integration and improving the quality of
urban education by dedicating targeted funds to specific programs.124 Notably
absent were proposals to mandate interdistrict busing, to redraw school district
lines so as to create more diverse school districts, or to combine these solutions
and create a metropolitan area-wide school district around Hartford across
which students would be bused. 125 Their absence was significant because such
measures can be the most direct and expedient ways of achieving
desegregation, and the Sheff majority had identified the 1909 districting statute
that made school district and town lines co-terminus as "the single most
important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic
minorities in the Hartford public school system." 126 While the court did not
explicitly declare the provision unconstitutional, one could easily conclude that
the State needed to reconsider the way school district lines were drawn in order
to comply with the decision.
However, in Executive Order No. 10, Governor Rowland effectively took
these measures off the table from the start, calling for a solution "based on
voluntary measures emphasizing local and parental decision-making as
opposed to state-imposed mandates such as 'forced bussing' [sic].' 2 7 Other
123. John G. Rowland, Exec. Order No. 10 (July 25, 1996), available at http://www.ct.gov/
govemor/cwp/view.asp?A=1328&Q=255922 [hereinafter Executive Order No. 10].
124. EDUC. IMPROVEMENT PANEL, supra note 97, at 34-35 (1997). The Panel's key
recommendation in the area of improving the quality of education in urban schools was to "provide
urban school districts with additional state aid targeted for increasing instructional time, improving
young students' reading skills, ensuring safe schools, providing alternative and transitional programs,
and enhancing the use of technology." Id. at 34. In the area of reducing racial isolation, the key
recommendations were to "provide for interdistrict public school choice," and to "make a long-term
commitment to supporting interdistrict magnet schools and significantly expand state support for these
schools in the next five years." Id. at 35.
125. There were, however, five Panel members who submitted a proposal to the Panel calling for
"all students to freely access any public school in the state." YVONNE P. DUNCAN ET AL., A PROPOSAL
TO THE EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT PANEL 2 (1997). The proposal sought to eliminate residency as a
requirement for school access and allow students to attend any school in the state. Id. at 3. One of the
signatories of the proposal eventually submitted a dissenting opinion to the Panel's official report in
which he criticized the Panel for "decid[ing] early that 'local control' of schools was more important
than obeying the court decision." EDUC. IMPROVEMENT PANEL, supra note 97, at 38 (statement of J.P.
Brown).
126. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1274.
127. Executive Order No. 10, supra note 123. Rowland was quoted as stating, with respect to
busing, "As long as I'm Governor, that is not one of the solutions." Richard Weizel, Integration Suit: 7
Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1996, § 13 (Conn.), at 1.
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state leaders, including Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Senate
Majority Leader James Fleming, also made clear that the State would not adopt
a solution that threatened "local control.' 28
The Education Improvement Panel, which appears to have entertained all
possibilities even if only cursorily, also rejected mandatory measures, reporting
that students, teachers, and parents in urban, suburban, and rural schools had all
"rejected quota-based busing and redistricting as options for reducing racial
isolation."' 129 In the end, then, with mandatory busing and redistricting off the
table, what remained in the Panel's report were voluntary integration measures
and efforts to improve the quality of urban education through targeted aid-
both of which would demand significant state funding to have any hope of
being effective.
Once the decision moved to the General Assembly, the central debate was
not over whether to adopt mandatory versus voluntary integration programs-
that issue was essentially settled' 3°-but rather over whether to focus on
voluntary integration or increasing funding for urban schools. In debating the
issue, factions of the General Assembly split along intriguing lines. Urban
Democrats, including the Black and Hispanic Caucus, were divided on the best
solution.' 3 1 While some favored voluntary integration, a significant number
preferred increasing resources for urban schools over integration. 132 Among the
latter group, many felt offended by the idea that minority children should have
to attend school next to white children to be able to learn; instead, they simply
needed more resources.' 33 By contrast, many suburban Republicans were
hesitant to invest more funds in urban schools without greater accountability.'
34
This faction complained that the large amount of state aid already flowing to
128. See Robert A. Frahm, Court Orders Desegregation; Rowland Rules Out Busing, Vows To
Keep Local School Control; Legislature, Governor Left To Manage Remedy, HARTFORD COURANT, July
10, 1996, at Al (quoting Senate Majority Leader James T. Fleming as stating "[w]e will not support
dismantling local control of education"); Weizel, supra note 127 (noting that Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal "indicated after the ruling that he would fight to insure that local control of
the school system is preserved").
129. EDUC. IMPROVEMENT PANEL, supra note 97, at v.
130. When interviewed, State Senator Gaffey, State Representative Staples, and former State
Representative Mattiello all agreed that mandatory busing was never truly on the table because it was
almost uniformly opposed. Interview with Thomas P. Gaffey, Co-Chair, Education Committee,
Connecticut General Assembly, in Hartford, Conn. (Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Gaffey Interview];
Interview with Brian Mattiello, former ranking Republican member on the Education Committee,
Connecticut General Assembly, now Undersecretary, Policy Development and Planning Division, State
of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, in Hartford, Conn. (Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter
Mattiello Interview]; Interview with Cameron Staples, Co-Chair, Education Committee, Connecticut
General Assembly, in New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Staples Interview].
131. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
132. Staples Interview, supra note 130; cf. Robert A. Frahm, Poll: Education, Rather than
Integration; Study Reveals Black Parents Want More Emphasis on School Quality, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 29, 1998, at Al (reporting on a national survey finding that black parents were turning
against integration and calling for better quality schools without integration).
133. Staples Interview, supra note 130.
134. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
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Hartford through the weighted need component of the school finance formula
was not producing results. They instead advocated for choice programs.'35
Some Republicans favored choice because it represented a market solution to
the problem of failing schools; for others, it was a way to ensure that a Sheff
remedy would have little impact on their children. 36 Representative Staples
confessed: "[I]t was the reverse of What I would have imagined. I would have
suspected that the suburban Republicans would have opposed integration, and
the urban Democrats would advocate for integration, and it became somewhat
the reverse."
'1 37
In the end, the legislature enacted a compromise solution in Public Act 97-
290.138 With respect to voluntary integration, the State established an
interdistrict choice program known as "Open Choice," which would allow
students in certain urban school districts to transfer to suburban schools where
space was available. The legislation also created a grant program to encourage
the creation and construction of racially diverse interdistrict magnet schools.
139
In addition to these two core programs, the legislation established a preference
in charter school enrollment for students from priority school districts,
140
promised a grant for the creation of a lighthouse school in Hartford,"4 1 and set
up an interdistrict cooperative grant program, which would encourage school
districts to come together for activities where their students would have an
opportunity to interact with diverse others.
42
Besides the programs aimed at reducing racial isolation, the legislation also
promised new grants to "priority school districts" to improve the quality of
education. 43 Earlier legislation defined priority school districts as those that
served the state's eight most populous towns, the eleven districts with the most
students on welfare, and the eleven towns that had the highest proportion of
students on welfare.' 44 These districts received special categorical grants,
which were supplemental to the state money all districts received under the
school finance formula adopted after Horton. In subsequent legislation passed
in 1997 and 1998, the General Assembly targeted hundreds of millions of
135. Staples Interview, supra note 130.
136. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130 ("The suburbanites were looking for as minimal action as
possibly could occur.").
137. Staples Interview, supra note 130.
138. An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and Opportunities, 1997 Conn. Acts 290 (Reg. Sess.)
(codified in scattered sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 10).
139. Id. § 16.
140. Id. § 7(c).
141. Id. § 18. A lighthouse school is an existing public school that adopts a specialized focus and
curriculum in order to improve inter- and intradistrict choice. Unlike magnet schools, lighthouse schools
are not explicitly required to be racially diverse; they are primarily aimed at increasing school choice.
142. Id. § 12.
143. Id. § 22.
144. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-266p (2003). Because many of these categories overlap, today
there are sixteen priority school districts in the state.
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dollars in categorical aid to these districts to improve school readiness for
preschoolers, foster early reading success, extend school hours, provide for
summer school, purchase new library books, and repair school buildings.
145
In addition to Public Act 97-290, the General Assembly also passed
legislation in 1997 requiring the State to take over the Hartford school
district. 146 This move was viewed by many as a crucial step in changing the
culture of the Hartford school system. After years of nepotism and
mismanagement, "[t]he governance of the school district was basically in
meltdown."' 147 The state takeover aimed to ensure sweeping structural and
administrative change.1
48
Wh'ile both redistricting and busing would have been administratively
complex and controversial, their financial costs likely would have been small
compared to the state funds needed to construct new magnet schools and
meaningfully invest in targeted educational programs. By 1998, the State had
increased total education funding by about $200 million over the level in the
year before Sheff came down. 149 Of that funding, the vast majority went toward
targeted grants aimed at improving education in the priority school districts. In
this way, the State had effectively adopted a school finance-oriented solution to
the problem of desegregation-a problem that Horton had already shown
dollars alone could not solve. The consequences of that decision became clear
in 1998 when the Sheffplaintiffs went back to court.
D. Subsequent Litigation and Settlement
Dissatisfied by Public Act 97-290's lack of specific guidelines for the
desegregation of the Hartford schools and the slow pace at which desegregation
was proceeding, the Sheff plaintiffs returned to superior court in 1998 seeking
to compel the State to comply with the supreme court's 1996 decision.
Although the plaintiffs did not oppose directing more resources to needy
145. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 936-37 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (describing these
programs and citing relevant legislation); Memorandum from Theodore S. Sergi, to the Connecticut
State Board of Education (April 5, 2002), Defense Exhibit No. 344, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. X03-CV-
0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (detailing the amount of money spent or budgeted by the state on
each of these programs from 1997-1998 through 2002-2003) [hereinafter Sergi Memorandum].
146. An Act Concerning the Hartford Public Schools, 1997 Conn. Acts 4 (Spec. Sess.).
147. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130.
148. By most accounts, the takeover, which ended in December 2002 with the transfer of power
back to the local school board, was a success. Improvements in achievement in Hartford schools
outpaced the statewide average, and graduation rates rose slightly. See Jeff Archer, Hartford Reshuffles
as Lead Actors Exit, EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 4, 2002, at 1. Indeed, eight Hartford residents sued to extend the
takeover, arguing that more time was needed to fully realize the goals Connecticut legislators set when
they authorized the takeover in 1997. See Jeff Archer, Judge in Hartford, Conn., OKs End to State
Takeover, EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 11, 2002, at 4. The court dismissed the suit, stating that the court could not
"second-guess the will of the legislature" and "ignore the voters of the city of Hartford." Id.
149. Sheff, 733 A.2d at 937; see also Sergi Memorandum, supra note 145 (providing an annual
breakdown of Sheff-related state funding).
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schools as a policy matter and had included a school finance claim in their
initial complaint, they viewed evidence that the state had directed dollars
toward improving urban education as legally irrelevant when there had been no
simultaneous reduction in racial isolation. 150 By 1998, the concentration of
minority students in Hartford schools had actually increased over the levels of
1989, when the suit was filed, to ninety-five percent of the student
population. 151
After surveying the range of programs the State had enacted in response to
Sheff Judge Julia Aurigemma, who took over the case from Judge Hammer,
rejected the plaintiffs' claim. She held that the State had complied with the
supreme court's order to develop a remedy, that "the plaintiffs failed to wait a
reasonable time," and that their return to court was "premature.'' 152 Notably,
Judge Aurigemma also expressed approval of using voluntary over mandatory
desegregation, finding that voluntary measures are "superior... because they
promote integration of more lasting duration with a minimum of opposition and
disruption."'
' 53
By the 1999-2000 school year, only six percent of Hartford schoolchildren
had access to integrated schools through participation in Open Choice or
attendance at interdistrict magnet schools, prompting the plaintiffs to return to
court again in December 2000. 154 In the view of one member of the plaintiffs'
legal team, the pace of desegregation up to that point had been "the same kind
of deliberate speed that gave Brown a bad name. ,155 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs
did not challenge the two primary means the State had chosen to reduce racial
isolation. Rather, they challenged the programs' "scale and scope."' 56 For the
first time, plaintiffs submitted their own detailed plan, setting out specific
numeric goals and yearly guidelines for achieving desegregation of the
150. See Sheff, 733 A.2d at 936 ("Curiously, at the hearing before this court, the plaintiffs' counsel
repeatedly objected to and labeled irrelevant evidence of the numerous efforts and initiatives aimed at
improving the quality of education.") As the court went on to point out, while the plaintiffs may have
been justified in expecting greater progress in reducing racial isolation, it is probably going too far to say
that directing funds to improve urban education is irrelevant to that goal. To the extent that the success
of interdistrict magnet schools located in Hartford depends on attracting suburban students to urban
areas, there is a connection between improving urban education (in a way that is either real or perceived)
and reducing racial isolation. Id.
151. Robert A. Frahm, Critics: Choice Plan is Failing, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 9, 1998, at Al.
152. Sheff, 733 A.2d at 938.
153. Id. at 942.
154. See Motion for Order Regarding the Implementation of the Project Choice Program and the
Interdistrict Magnet School Program in the Hartford Region at 3, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. X03-CV89-
0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 28, 2000). Two percent of Hartford schoolchildren went to
racially balanced interdistrict magnet school, and four percent went to suburban schools through Open
Choice. Id. at 2.
155. Interview with Philip Tegeler, former Legal Director, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, inHartford, Conn. (Dec. 20, 2002).
156. Plaintiffs' Description of the Case, Causes of Action and Relief Sought, and Estimate of Time




Hartford schools using the State's voluntary methods. 157 The "Stevens Plan"
rested on the premise that thirty percent of Hartford students should attend
desegregated schools within four years and set out concrete steps to reach that
goal.
158
A hearing began before Judge Aurigemma in April 2002, and after three
weeks of testimony the judge hinted that she would not accept either the State's
or the plaintiffs' plans as they then existed. 59 This prompted the two sides to
begin negotiating, and in January 2003, after months of talks, they reached a
settlement agreement. According to the terms of the settlement, the State will
aim to ensure that by June 2007, thirty percent of Hartford students will be
educated in an environment of reduced isolation. 16 It will do so by building
eight new magnet schools in the Hartford area (two per year for four years),
ensuring the gradual increase of students participating in Open Choice, and
increasing funding for cooperative grant programs.161 The settlement's
exclusive focus on Hartford is consistent with the plaintiffs' longstanding
position that while they "hoped and expected the case to have a beneficial
impact on [N]ew Haven and Bridgeport," the Sheff decision applied only to
Hartford. 161
The State will spend $45 million to operationalize these programs, and will
provide an estimated $90 million more for the construction of new magnet
schools or the conversion of existing schools to magnets. 163 Though the
157. Prepared by Leonard B. Stevens, Ed.D., this plan marked the first time the plaintiffs had set
out any kind of concrete numeric goals and a plan for how to reach them. Interview with Dennis Parker,
then Attorney, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, in New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 2, 2002).
158. Report of Leonard B. Stevens (Jan. 2002), Plaintiff Exhibit No. 15, Sheffv. O'Neill, No. X03-
CV-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002).
159. Robert A. Frahm, Sheff vs. O'Neill Lawsuit Settled, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 22, 2003, at
A 1; Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
160. See Stipulation and Order at 3, Sheffv. O'Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
22, 2003). The stipulated agreement calculates the percentage of students being educated in settings of
"reduced isolation" by dividing the percent of minority public school students residing in Hartford who
are either attending public schools outside of Hartford through Open Choice or attending interdistrict
magnet schools, by the total number of minority public school students residing in Hartford. The
numerator of the fraction can also rise by a small amount every time the State grants $50,000 of state
dollars to Hartford for interdistrict cooperative programs. See id.
161. Id. at 4-6.
162. E-mail from Philip Tegeler, former Legal Director, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, to Lauren Wetzler (Apr. 20, 2003, 09:05:03) (on file with author). While the plaintiffs never
objected to the 1997 legislation's expansion of Sheff programs to Bridgeport and New Haven, they
worried that doing so would slow the pace of desegregation in Hartford-the focus of their case. Thus,
in the 1998 and 2002 hearings, they strenuously objected to the State's introduction of evidence about
desegregation programs it was implementing outside of the Hartford region. Id. The judge overruled the
objections, even though her opinion indicates that she agreed that the case was ultimately about
Hartford. E.g., Sheffv. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 938 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) ("Certainly one method of
assessing the efficacy of the state's efforts to reduce racial and ethnic isolation in the Hartford schools is
to wait a reasonable amount of time to see how many students in Hartford are still attending schools in
which they are racially or ethnically isolated.").
163. Robert A. Frahm, Legislators Approve Sheff Settlement; House Votes 87-60 for Integration
Plan, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 26, 2003, at B I.
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settlement was not "the vision we started with 14 years ago," said Elizabeth
Horton Sheff, mother of lead plaintiff Milo Sheff, it was, in her words, "a giant
step forward."' 164 After two trips back to court, the plaintiffs had achieved some
assurance of relief. 
65
E. Sheff's Lessons
Like the programs the General Assembly enacted after Sheff, the settlement
wears an expensive $135 million pricetag. In Part III, we will begin to
understand the significance of the State's reliance on an expensive solution and
how dollars devoted to Sheff have come to compete with dollars needed to
redress problems with Connecticut's regular school finance system. For now, it
is useful to inquire in more depth into how the State ended up with a costly
solution that focused on a combination of priority school district grants and
voluntary integration. The reason is familiar: Left by the court to respond, the
State devised a remedy that accorded with political realities, even if that meant
departing from the court's conception of the constitutional infirmity.
In responding to Sheff legislators did not feel inhibited by the court's
definition of the constitutional infirmity-the existence of de facto segregation.
Instead, they translated the suit into an opportunity to remedy what they
perceived to be the state's educational ills. Former ranking Republican member
of the Education Committee, Brian Mattiello, explained that his initial reaction
to the case was to "separate what the Constitution or what the judicial branch
was saying from what I thought we should be doing in education." 166 Rather
than feeling limited to the words of the Sheff opinion, it was "the spirit of
Sheff" which Mattiello understood as a mandate "to do more," that guided him
and other legislators in designing a remedy. 167 For example, for Senator Gaffey,
the Education Committee Co-Chair, even though the supreme court opinion
spoke of racial and economic isolation, the suit represented "an amazing
opportunity, particularly in leadership... to leverage new funding for our
towns" through categorical grants. As he went on to explain, "That's exactly
164. Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Turns Ahead; Settlement: A Four-Year Effort Begins to Help Undo
Hartford's School Segregation, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 23, 2003, at Al. Commentators have already
expressed additional concerns about the settlement, above all, what will happen to the seventy percent of
students left behind in racially concentrated schools. See, e.g., Rachel Gottlieb & Daniela Altimari,
Reaction: What About the Kids Who Get Left Out?, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 23, 2003, at A 1.
165. There is already cause for concern, however, that the State may not fully comply with the
terms of the settlement. Due to a shortfall in the Hartford school budget, the two magnet schools that the
State was obligated to open by September 2003 under the terms of the settlement did not open in
permanent buildings, and one had only pinety-one students enrolled, seven of whom were from the
suburbs. See Letter from Philip Tegeler et al., SheffPlaintiffs' Co-Counsel, to Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal 1 (Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with author). Given that the settlement puts an obligation on the
State to open the schools, it seems that Hartford's budgetary troubles cannot legally justify the delay of
the two schools.




what happened. The school readiness program, the early reading program, new
money for library books, for maintenance ... That all happened because Sheff
opened up a door for us."'168 Legislators quickly concluded that to make the
remedy politically palatable across the state, it would have to be a statewide
solution that covered more than the Hartford schools.1 69 Leaders of the
Education Committee also apparently felt that developing a statewide remedy
would help forestall future Sheff-like suits elsewhere in the state, or at least
serve as a defense if such suits arose.1
70
Aiming to fulfill "the spirit of Sheff" in the way they saw fit, legislators
were guided by political realities and the context of a limited budget.' 71 The
strong tradition of local control in Connecticut and the extremely controversial
nature of busing help explain why such approaches were quickly dismissed. In
a state that is so fiercely attached to town-based local control that it lacks any
form of county government, 172 a plan that threatened to break down existing
school district boundaries and create regional districts would have been
"political suicide" for suburban legislators. 173 And given the immediate public
outcry against mandatory busing from all sides, busing would have been
equally lethal for most legislators.
While it is difficult to pin down the precise reasons why busing was so
unpopular,' 74 a few factors seem salient. It is likely that most white suburban
parents opposed it because they objected to moving their children from what
they perceived to be successful neighborhood schools to under-performing
schools farther away. Others may have had less benign, even racist reasons,
such as wanting to keep their children from interacting with minorities. Many
minority parents also opposed busing, however, preferring to have their
168. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130. Both Senator Gaffey and Representative Staples, who were
then-and now-co-chairs of the Education Committee, represented some of the priority school districts
that would benefit from the new targeted grants. (Staples represented New Haven, and Gaffey
represented Meriden and Middletown.) Senator Gaffey's comment that Sheff created an opportunity,
"particularly in leadership," to direct new funds to "our towns" is best understood in this context.
169. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
170. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130.
171. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130 ("It was necessary for a group of moderates to put
together the best plan in the context of a limited budget and within the context of political realities.").
172. Only one other state, Rhode Island, lacks county government. See Swift, supra note 85.
173. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130. Politicians' rhetoric notwithstanding, in theory, redrawing
district lines does not have to sacrifice local control. New local boards of education could always be
created in the redrawn districts such that parents could still influence educational decision-making.
However, to the extent that local control in Connecticut shades into "localism"--fondness for one's
town-redrawing school district lines would disrupt local control. Because Connecticut lacks county
government, the Connecticut town does seem to take on an especially important role for residents of the
state.
174. In a survey of 500 Connecticut residents conducted after Sheff, fifty-nine percent reported that
they opposed busing, while twenty-seven percent favored it. Robert A. Frahm, Residents As Divided as
Court on Sheff; Courant-ISI Connecticut Poll, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 16, 1997, at Al; see also
Rick Green et al., Word of Court's Decision 'Moved Like Lightening' Through Community, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 10, 1996, at A13.
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children remain in nearby neighborhood schools rather than sending them on
long bus rides. 175 Some reportedly felt offended by the notion that their
children had to be sent into white suburbs to be able to learn. 176 Many Latino
parents worried that their children would lose bilingual programs they had
fought to bring to neighborhood schools. 177 In addition, it seems that the
memory of Boston's violent experience with busing loomed large in people's
minds. As Senator Gaffey explained, "I didn't favor [busing] because if it
didn't work in South Boston, I didn't think it was going to work here. It was a
failed, miserable experiment."'
178
Executive and legislative officials may have felt especially comfortable
dismissing busing and redistricting because they did not think the supreme
court would ever require their adoption after Justice Peters retired and was
replaced with a more conservative justice.179 Some commentators have
suggested that Peters' anticipated retirement and the expectation that the new
justice would tip the vote 4-3 in favor of the dissent if the case ever returned to
the supreme court on a compliance motion might have weakened the opinion's
mandate in the eyes of some officials.'
80
Regardless of why busing and redistricting were rejected, their dismissal
left voluntary integration as the remaining solution for reducing racial
isolation. 181 The two main voluntary proposals involved interdistrict choice and
175. Staples Interview, supra note 130.
176. According to Representative Staples, "The particular opponents of [busing] were urban
minority advocates because they found it condescending to suggest that the only way their child[ren]
could learn was by sitting next to a white child." Id. For a more thorough analysis of why many black
parents oppose busing, see John M. Vickerstaff, Getting Off the Bus: Why Many Black Parents Oppose
Busing, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 155 (1998).
177. Parker Interview, supra note 157.
178. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130.
179. Rowland appointed Francis M. McDonald Jr. to fill Peters' vacancy. As reported by the
Hartford Courant, "McDonald is viewed as a conservative who will shift the balance on many of the
kind of issues that drew 4-3 rulings last session." Lynne Tuohy, Callahan Takes Supreme Court Helm;
Native of Norwalk Vows to Address Civil Case Backlog, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 30, 1996, at A3.
Rowland also appointed Justice Callahan, a dissenter in Sheff to be the new Chief Justice.
180. See, e.g., Jonathan Rabinovitz, Hartford School Integration Panel Formed, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1996, at B2; Lynne Tuohy, Majority Says City's System Unconstitutional, HARTFORD COURANT,
July 10, 1996, at Al (describing the Sheffruling as "fragile" and commenting, "The imminent retirement
of Peters from the court... could jeopardize the ruling.").
181. In addition to the political factors militating for voluntary integration, legislators' opinions
may have been shaped by evidence, trumpeted by two of the state's expert witnesses in the Sheff trial,
that voluntary integration plans were more successful than mandatory plans in terms of providing a
stable and productive remedy. See DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE 113 (1995); CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL,
THE CARROT OR THE STICK 32-33 (1990); Rossell, supra note 120; Christine H. Rossell & David J.
Armor, The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 1968-1991, 24 AM. POL. Q. 267, 298 (1996).
According to Rossell, voluntary plans are more successful because: "1) they produce dramatically less
white and middle class black and Hispanic flight than mandatory reassignments; 2) they produce the
same or more interracial exposure; and 3) they are the preferred desegregation technique of parents of all
races." Rossell, supra note 120, at 1218-19. Judge Aurigemma concluded that voluntary methods were
superior to mandatory ones after the first Sheffcompliance hearing. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925,
942 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
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interdistrict magnet schools. Dramatically increasing the Open Choice
interdistrict busing program was unlikely to be effective on a broad scale for
several reasons. First, because suburban parents would tend not to send their
children to Hartford, it would never be more than a one-way movement of
students. Therefore, unless suburban districts were willing to open up huge
numbers of new seats in their schools, its scope would always be limited. The
reality was that while many suburban schools opened up seats, others either
truly lacked room or felt a "deep reserve"-some might call it a racist
aversion-to having "Hartford minority kids coming into [their] school
district." '182 This put significant pressure on magnet schools to carry the day in
reducing racial isolation. But as the Sheff settlement shows, constructing
magnet schools is expensive, particularly when they must be attractive enough
to lure suburban students away from successful schools closer to home. It
would, therefore, take a huge commitment of state funds to effectuate any
measureable integration.
Thus, just as the political branches translated Horton from a case about
disparities in expenditures into a way to direct more money to urbai schools, in
1997, legislators transformed Sheff from a mandate to desegregate into an
opportunity to leverage funds to "do more" for Connecticut's students in the
ways they saw fit. Consequently, for some legislators, the legacy of Sheff is
what it has done for school fumding. As Senator Gaffey boasted, "Look at all
the things we've done. Look at all the money associated with these
programs.... Yes, we always did recognize the constitutional obligation to
provide an equal educational opportunity, and this is how we did it."'
8 3
However, the decision to adopt a costly remedy to Sheff has had
consequences not just for the success of desegregation, but also for statewide
school finance equity. In Horton, a trade-off arose between channeling funds to
urban schools through the need component of the GTB formula and achieving
greater equalization of funding for the state's property-poor suburban
schools. 184 Likewise, by relying on money to respond to Sheff, the State has
pitted achieving desegregation against adhering to Horton's mandate to provide
equal educational opportunity in terms of statewide school expenditures. The
next case, Johnson v. Rowland, suggests how that trade-off arose.
III. JOHNSON V. ROWLAND
In 1998, school finance litigation returned to Connecticut. Students in a
diverse group of working-class and middle-class towns and cities filed suit
182. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130 ("Anyone who suggests that's not true isn't telling the
truth.").
183. Id.
184. See supra Section I.D.
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against the State for failing to provide them with an equal or adequate
education. While the complaint in Johnson v. Rowland was withdrawn due to a
lack of funds to prosecute the suit, the case served as a reminder that while the
State strived to meet the obligations imposed by Sheff to reduce racial isolation,
it had a continuing duty to fulfill the financially-oriented vision of equal
educational opportunity embodied in Horton. The suit further suggested that in
a world of limited resources and political will, the State had allowed its second
duty to lag; fixing problems with the state's school finance formula had lost the
competition for state dollars and attention.
A. The School Finance Formula from Horton to Johnson
One of the crucial developments arising from Horton was the switch from a
flat per pupil grant to a guaranteed tax base (GTB) formula for funding the
State's share of education costs. In 1988, the formula changed again, this time
to a foundation formula known as the Education Cost Sharing (ECS) grant. The
essential innovation of ECS was the establishment of a "foundation amount,"
which constituted the base aid each town would receive before adjustments
were made to account for differences in need. In theory, the foundation amount
represented "the minimum amount of money necessary to provide an adequate
education for an average student on a per-pupil basis."' 8 5 In addition to the ECS
grant, which supplied regular education funds, the State continued to provide
separate funding for special education and transportation on a sliding scale
according to district wealth, as well as targeted categorical grants such as
priority school district grants.
For several years after the adoption of the new formula, interdistrict
disparities declined. 86 But starting in the early 1990s, the State began making
adjustments to the formula in order to lower its education costs., 87 By 1997,
interdistrict disparities were again on the rise.
The General Assembly made two particularly important cost-cutting
changes to the ECS formula soon after it was adopted-changes that later
would form the basis for the complaint in Johnson v. Rowland. First, faced with
years of budget deficits and looking to lower state education costs, legislators
in 1992 imposed a cap on how much additional aid a district could receive from
the state from year to year. This meant that even if a district experienced rapid
population growth, its funding could only increase by a low, fixed percentage
each year. 188 Second, in 1993, the legislature froze the foundation amount
185. LPRIC REPORT, supra note 19, at 33.
186. See id. at 20-22.
187. For a complete summary of the changes made to the formula and their impact, see id. at app.
C. In the following paragraph I will highlight only a few of the most significant changes. Unless
otherwise noted, the information contained herein derives from id.
188. Initially, funding could only increase by a maximum of two percent per year. Today, it can
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rather than allowing it to grow with the rising costs of education, as had
originally been intended. The foundation thus became disconnected from actual
education spending; if a district wanted to spend as much as the original
formula predicted was needed "to provide an adequate education," the district
itself would have to make up the difference. While the foundation amount has
been raised since 1993, it has not kept pace with the rising costs of
education.'
89
Besides these two cost-cutting measures, the General Assembly also
implemented a "hold harmless" provision in 1989 to protect towns from
experiencing a sudden drop in aid from one year to the next. While this change
helped many districts, it hurt those districts that were experiencing rapid
population growth, as it meant that funding that might otherwise have been
reallocated to them remained temporarily with districts whose need for funding
had declined.
As a result of these and other distortions, the State's contribution to
education peaked at 45.5% of all funding in 1989-90 and has never again
returned to that level.190 In 2003, the State provided only thirty-nine percent of
school funding,'91 making Connecticut more reliant on local property taxes for
K-12 education than any other state.192 In light of this trend, municipalities that
relied on ECS funding, yet failed to receive as much state aid as the original
formula would have allowed, began to question whether the State had forgotten
about the mandate of Horton v. Meskill.
The towns that spoke out most forcefully against the distortions were a
mixture of urban and working-class suburban communities. The mayors of
Bridgeport and East Hartford, along with Robert DeCrescenzo, the former
Mayor of East Hartford and by 1998 an attorney in private practice, conceived
of bringing suit against the State to challenge the changes to the ECS
formula. 193 Though the named plaintiffs were students, it was their towns and
cities that were underwriting the cost of the litigation.9
4
increase by six percent per year for some districts. Id.
189. In 1995, the foundation amount was increased, but only to compensate for building the state's
special education funding into the formula. For the past five years, it has stood at $5,891 per pupil. If the
foundation amount had risen in accordance with actual costs, as originally intended, it would have been
$7,900 per pupil in October 2003. REPORT OF THE STATE OF CONN., BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
PROPERTY TAX BURDENS AND SMART GROWTH INCENTIVES 26 (2003)
[hereinafter BLUE RIBBON REPORT], available at hup://www.ccm-ct.org/advocacy/2002-2003/
blue-ribbon commission report-oct2003.pdf.
190. Id. at 26.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Telephone Interview with Robert DeCrescenzo, Attorney, Updike, Kelly & Spelacy (Dec. 18,
2002) [hereinafter DeCrescenzo Interview].
194. It was necessary to have the named plaintiffs be the students and not the towns because in
Connecticut a city lacks standing to sue its creator, the State. See Waterford v. Conn. State. Bd. of Educ.,
169 A.2d 891, 895 (Conn. 1961).
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Many of the towns, like East Hartford and West Haven, were "inner-ring
suburbs"--suburbs immediately surrounding cities that, though historically
middle-class, were experiencing rapidly changing demographics and wealth
characteristics, including rising poverty and declining property tax capacity.
195
With a cap on the growth in their state funds, a hold harmless provision in
place, 196 a low foundation amount, and a host of other distortions to the formula
that reduced state funding,' 97 these communities argued that the state was not
fulfilling its constitutional obligation under Horton L
But the towns that joined the Johnson suit were not the only ones suffering
from the ECS distortions. Indeed, because many of the Johnson plaintiffs were
from priority school districts that had benefited from post-Sheff funding, they
may not have been the best spokespersons for their cause.1 98 Other districts in
the state, such as property-poor mill towns in Northeastern Connecticut that
have not benefited from priority school district grants and are under-funded
through the distortions to ECS, would seem to have a stronger claim. To former
Commissioner Sergi, these towns, which are predominantly white, have
relatively little property wealth, and whose achievement scores hover just
above those of the urban schools, are the best candidates for a successful
adequacy suit. 199 Senator Gaffey agreed: "If a case was brought by those
Northeastern poorer communities that haven't had the benefit of the priority
school district and categorical monies, they possibly would have a far more
persuasive case that could win the day in court.' 200 Such towns might claim
that even though the State was spending money on magnet schools and
improving education in priority school districts to remedy Sheff, it could not
forget its duty to fund all of Connecticut's schools at a level that ensures some
degree of equal educational opportunity--or, as the Johnson plaintiffs would
have it, adequacy. Given that the mill towns have not filed suit, however,
Johnson at least provides a second-best way of illustrating the desperation of
towns across the state that felt squeezed as an increasing fraction of the state's
education budget went to fund the Sheff remedy.
195. Id.
196. The hold harmless provision would have helped the Johnson plaintiffs if their populations
were decreasing. Instead, however, they were increasing.
197. The plaintiffs also cited distortions to the Income Adjustment Factor, the Guaranteed Wealth
Level, the Minimum Expenditure Requirement, and the Special Education Reimbursement Grant. See
Second Amended Complaint at 15-16, Johnson v. Rowland, No. CV-98-0492103-S (Conn. Super. Ct.,
filed Mar. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. I have focused on the cap, hold harmless,
and foundation amount because based on interviews, these appear to be the most significant distortions.
198. On the other hand, to the extent that the plaintiffs' districts have experienced rapid population
growth, they are well-suited to complain about specific distortions to the school finance formula such as
the cap.
199. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
200. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130.
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B. The Johnson Litigation
In March 1998, the Johnson plaintiffs filed their school finance suit against
Governor Rowland, former Commissioner Sergi, and other state officials,
claiming that they were being "deprived of a suitable and substantially equal
educational opportunity." 20 1 The plaintiffs made several allegations, two of
which warrant special attention. The plaintiffs first charged that the State's ECS
formula had failed to provide a foundation that accurately reflected the true cost
of educational expenditures. 20 2 They cited the State's failure to update the
formula to keep pace with rising costs and the higher amount they would have
been receiving if the foundation amount had stayed up to date. In their view,
the foundation amount failed "to accurately reflect the cost of [a] suitable and
substantially equal public education"20 3 and had a "disproportionately negative
impact on plaintiffs' school districts where property wealth is low and
declining, student populations are growing, special education costs are rising
and high property taxes effectively eliminate further property tax increases as a
revenue source to compensate for the deficient foundation amount."
2°4
The plaintiffs next charged that the combination of the cap and hold
harmless provisions denied them a "suitable and substantially equal educational
opportunity," as these distortions deprived them of the full amount of State
funding they would have received under an undistorted ECS formula. 20 Since
the measures were put in place, they alleged, many school districts had lost
staggering amounts of state funds: "Bridgeport - $118,675,173; East Hartford -
$41,212,148; Meriden - $35,601,427; New Britain - $58,231,254.206
The plaintiffs' legal claims relied on the same constitutional provisions
used in Horton and Sheff The Johnson plaintiffs thereby situated their case
as the next to vindicate the right to equal educational opportunity in
Connecticut. Even as the complaint spoke of "equal educational opportunity,"
however, it also pressed a different kind of school finance claim: an adequacy
claim.208 According to DeCrescenzo, the Johnson suit "follow[ed] from the side
of Sheff that wasn't pursued" 209-the adequacy claim that the supreme court in
Sheff never reached. However, because Sheff focused on race while Horton was
201. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 197, at 2.
202. Id. at 11-13.
203. Jd. at 12.
204. Id. at 13.
205. See id. at 13.
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id. at 22 (citing article I, sections I and 20, and article VIII, section 1, of the Connecticut
Constitution). The third claim was an exception; it invoked another education provision, article VII,
section 4.
208. In shifting from equity to adequacy, Johnson reflects a broader trend in school finance
litigation. For a comprehensive account of this trend, see Heise, supra note 10.
209. DeCrescenzo Interview, supra note 193.
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a school finance case, Johnson is best understood as "the modem day version
of Horton v. Meskill.' ,210 Like in the pre-Horton era, the State had begun to
over-rely on local property taxes to fund education when the State itself had a
constitutional obligation to provide all children in Connecticut with an equal
educational opportunity. But whereas "Horton v. Meskill was largely an
education equity case," according to DeCrescenzo, "[Johnson is] really an
education adequacy case, meaning that the outcomes of the education system
need to be equalized., 211 The Johnson plaintiffs' central argument was that due
to distortions to the ECS formula, the State was not providing enough funding
to enable them to receive an adequate education.
What the plaintiffs did not acknowledge in their complaint is that some of
their school districts were priority school districts that had benefited from
significant categorical funding after Sheff. Thus, while they might have been
receiving less funding through ECS than the original formula would have
provided, the State had augmented other sources of funding in recent years-
perhaps so much so that the plaintiffs that came from priority school districts
were receiving more than they would have if the formula had been fixed.212
This might have constituted a powerful defense at trial.
But Johnson will never go to trial. The school districts that were
underwriting the litigation could not afford to continue paying DeCrescenzo's
213legal bills, and the suit was dropped in October 2003. As DeCrescenzo
explained, "It's kind of a Catch-22: if they're not getting the money they need
to fund their schools, it's hard for them to fund this lawsuit. ' 214 With most of
the public interest organizations that might have been interested tied up with
Sheff, DeCrescenzo was unable to gain their financial support for the suit.
What, then, is the significance of a suit that never went to trial?
C. Johnson's Lessons
On a practical level, Johnson is important because it prompted Governor
Rowland to convene a task force on school finance in 1998 to study the
modifications to the ECS formula. Responding to the task force's
recommendations, in 1999, the General Assembly passed legislation calling for
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130 ("If I was arguing against Johnson-if I was the State
arguing this case-I would take a look and say, 'Okay, Meriden you're a plaintiff? Let's look at what
you get with ECS, and let's take a look at what you're getting with all the priority school district
money-all the categorical money.... You're getting more in the categorical funding, the priority
school district grant coupled with the ECS grant money you're receiving-that's a larger increase than if
you took away the cap."').
213. See Natalie Missakian, Coalition Drops Lawsuit Over School Funding, NEW HAVEN REG.,
Oct. 9, 2003, at A4; see also Oshrat Carmiel, Funding Lawsuit Foundering; Plaintiffs' Ranks Reduced
by Cost, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 25, 2002, at A2 1.
214. DeCrescenzo Interview, supra note 193.
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a phase-out of the ECS cap and a slight increase in the foundation level.
2 5
However, the state's recent budget crisis delayed that plan.216 Moreover, state-
sponsored reports published in 2002 and 2003 confirmed that serious problems
217
with ECS still remain. Like the unheeded reports of the early 1970s, the most
recent report called on the State to share the burden of education funding more
equitably with the towns and cities.
2 18
On a more symbolic level, in raising awareness about the State's need to
maintain equal and adequate school funding even while responding to Sheff,
Johnson reminded the State that it retains a constitutional obligation from
Horton v. Meskill to provide equal educational opportunity in terms of both
racial balance and financial expenditures. In this way, much as Sheff staked a
claim for the importance of desegregation litigation after Horton, Johnson
exposed the continued relevance of school finance litigation after Sheff
Most significantly, Johnson forces us to confront the possibility that in
responding to Sheff through categorical and school construction grants, the
State traded off money that it otherwise could have used to sustain adequate
ECS funding for many municipalities. In this way, it illustrates the
consequences of translating desegregation into a primarily financial endeavor.
Before exploring evidence of a trade-off, it is important to respond to two
possible objections. First, in a complex state budget, it is always risky to say
that a particular dollar taken from X program was reallocated to Y program, for
"[e]very dollar competes with one another."2 19 Programs that responded to
Sheff were hardly the only budget items that competed with updating and
correcting the distortions to ECS; the costs of special education, prisons, and
Medicaid-to name just a few programs-have also been rising in recent years
in Connecticut and putting pressure on state education funding. 22 Nevertheless,
there is reason to believe that lawmakers and members of the education
bureaucracy sometimes framed their decisions on how to allocate a finite
education budget as a choice of what to do when "you only get one last dollar
and can spend it in one place." 22 1 As former Commissioner Sergi stated, "Give
me two dollars and I think we have an obligation to continue to support all
schools in the state through the ECS grant.... But if I only have the one dollar
I go with the categorical grant." 222 Similarly, former legislator Brian Mattiello
indicated that "we did make some conscious choices" between easing the
215. LPRIC REPORT, supra note 19, at app. C.
216. See Missakian, supra note 213.
217. See generally BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 189; LPRIC REPORT, supra note 19.
218. See BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 189, at 8, 26-27.
219. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
220. Telephone Interview with Rich Carmelich, Government Finance Analyst, Connecticut
Conference of Municipalities (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Carmelich Interview].
221. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
222. Id.
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property tax issue underlying ECS and funding categorical programs like early
reading success. 22 3 This is not to say that legislators consciously thought of
responding to Sheff as a decision not to fix ECS, or that fixing ECS did not
224generate a political debate independent of Sheff There undoubtedly are
independent reasons why ECS has not been completely fixed, such as its great
expense and the political controversy that ensues whenever some towns stand
to gain more from a piece of legislation than others. 225 However, it does
suggest that in the face of a finite budget, decisions favoring one education
issue over another were made.
Second, after Horton v. Meskill, the ECS formula itself heavily redistributes
funds from districts with fewer needy students to districts with needier students.
It can, therefore, be difficult to discern the extent to which some districts would
still feel that they are receiving insufficient state aid relative to districts with
needier students irrespective of post-Sheff legislation. Nevertheless, both
empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest that even if Sheff did not create the
tension between targeting funds to priority school districts and funding the rest
of the state, it certainly sharpened it.
Fo bring the ECS foundation level up to date and fix its distortions would
have been an expensive endeavor at any time, even in the late 1990s when the
226 227State had plenty of money. But Sheff exacerbated the problem. Indeed,
starting in 1997 when the legislature passed its post-Sheff remedial legislation,
which leaned heavily on categorical grants and money for the construction of
magnet schools, the State began to shift the focus of its funding away from the
ECS formula and toward categorical and construction grants. From 1996-2000,
categorical and construction grants increased 60% and 160%, respectively,
while funding for ECS increased by only 8%.228 As a result, ECS declined as a
share of state aid for education from 82% to 67% from 1996 to 2000, while
categorical and construction grants increased as a share of state aid from 8% to
13%, and from 10% to 19%, respectively. 229 In roughly the same period, state
grants for Sheff-related programs, including the main priority school district
grant as well as grants for early childhood programs, interdistrict magnet
223. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
224. Id. The Blue Ribbon Report, supra note 189, illustrates one way in which reforming the ECS
formula plays a role in other debates, including the issue of "Smart Growth." The report calls for school
finance reform, not explicitly to achieve greater equality of educational opportunity, but rather to reduce
the property tax burden and thereby alleviate one cause of suburban sprawl.
225. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
226. Gaffey Interview, supra note 130. The Blue Ribbon Report, supra note 189, at 26, estimates
that just bringing the foundation up to date would cost the State at least $500 million. Id.
227. See Sergi Memorandum, supra note 145, at 2. Between 1997-1998 and 2000-2001, the State
spent $521.1 million on Sheff-related programs, including categorical grants to improve the quality of
education and programs aimed at reducing racial isolation. Id. Between 2001-2002 and 2002-2003,
another $356.8 million was budgeted. Id.




schools, Open Choice, and other programs rose from $64.3 million in 1997-
2301998 to $177.8 million in 2000-200 1. While the absolute amount of money
spent on Sheff remedies would not have made up for the shortfall in ECS, it
could have gone a long way toward that goal.23'
Turning to anecdotal evidence, DeCrescenzo hinted at the existence of a
trade-off when he offered one reason why it proved difficult to obtain the
support of public interest organizations for the Johnson case. Some
organizations believed that the State would, in the end, choose between
committing funds to desegregation and to reforming the system of school
finance: "There's a finite number of state dollars available to address these
issues, and to the extent that money needs to be spent on Sheff or us, it may
come at the expense of the Sheff remedies. 232 Philip Tegeler, former Legal
Director of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation (CCLU) and a
lead Sheff attorney, refutes the idea the State can only afford to respond either
to Sheff or to Johnson.233 Indeed, Tegeler hoped that Johnson would "expand
the pie" of resources available for education.234 Even so, when members of the
Johnson team approached CCLU about taking on a new school finance suit
after Johnson was withdrawn, CCLU declined.235 As Tegeler conceded, for
"CCLU to take on Johnson-style litigation at the same time we are prosecuting
the Sheff remedy would set up an artificial dilemma, where we are basically
forced to compete against ourselves."
236
Comments by former Commissioner Sergi confirm that state officials
perceived there to be competition between ECS and post-Sheff funding:
I'd have no doubt that the fact that we did more categoricals in the last five years,
and had to respond to Sheff v. O'Neill, particularly around magnet schools is our
biggest investment-we're up to $45 million in magnet schools-that's a
significant bill in this little state that doesn't like to spend money.... Certainly that
competes with ECS right now.237
Without greater political will to further expand state education funding, Sergi
suggested, remedying ECS has had to take a backseat to the immediate need of
responding to Sheff. Former State Representative Brian Mattiello of Torrington
also "concede[d] that [among] what was available for education spending, we
230. Sergi Memorandum, supra note 145.
231. See supra note 227 for spending on post-Sheff programs. The Connecticut Conference of
Municipalities, a lobbying group for the state's towns and cities, estimates that between 1995 and 2002,
the cap on ECS alone cost municipalities more than $800 million in lost state aid. Connecticut
Conference of Municipalities, Major Issues in Financing Local Public Education 4 (Oct. 30, 2002) (on
file with the author).
232. DeCrescenzo Interview, supra note 193.
233. Telephone Interview with Philip Tegeler, former Legal Director, Connecticut Civil Liberties




237. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
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placed an emphasis on Sheff funding. ' 3 8
Some Connecticut residents also perceived the existence of a trade-off. As
the General Assembly began to debate solutions to Sheff many Torrington
residents wondered, "What [resources] are we losing for them to gain?, 239 This
"us/them ' 240 dynamic reflected the fear that if Sheff meant investing more
resources in urban schools, suburban and rural school districts might lose out.
In the northeastern Connecticut mill towns, where property values tend to be
low, there has been grumbling since Sheff about a trade-off in who receives
state funds. As former Commissioner Sergi explained, "The people of
northeastern Connecticut feel they've been cut out of the state education pie
because of Sheff.''241 One fears that the perception that white children in
property-poor mill towns are losing in order for minority children to gain could
augment some of the same racial prejudices that may quietly underlie the
segregation of the state.
In January 2003, with the State committing millions to the Sheff settlement
while also running a $650 million budget deficit and expecting a $2 billion
budget gap for the next fiscal year,242 the trade-off became starker and more
public. Asking rhetorically, "Is [paying for the settlement] going to take
[money] away from other communities?" Rowland responded, "Absolutely." 243
As one newspaper reported, Rowland has "warned that paying for [the
settlement] would most likely force the state to cut money for core programs,
including public transportation and education grants that the state's cities and
towns count on.'244 Indeed, Rowland's March 2003 budget proposed cutting
$20 million in ECS funding.245 Some, like New Haven Board of Education
President Carlos Torre, have lamented the trade-off: "It's a shame that the state
pits one city against another."
246
IV. TRADE-OFFS
Scholars and practitioners continue to debate the relative merits of school
238. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Sergi Interview, supra note 21; see also Rick Green, Schools Want Fair Share of Funding Pie;
Small Districts Call for Change, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 14, 1999, at A3 (quoting Alan Chapin, the
first selectman of Washington and president of the Council of Small Towns, as asking, "How is it
possibly equal when Cornwall gets $35 [in state education aid] and Hartford gets $6,500?").
242. Paul von Zielbauer, It's Gridlock in Hartford over Budget and Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2003, at B6.
243. Natalie Missakian & Gregory B. Hladky, SheffSettlement to Cost $45 Million, NEW HAVEN
REGISTER, Jan. 23, 2003, at 1.
244. Paul von Zielbauer, Hartford Plan Would Further Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at
A22 (citing Governor Rowland as predicting that "[t]he cuts could force many local governments to
increase property taxes to balance their school budgets.").
245. MaryEllen Fillo, Cities, Towns Take a Hit, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al 1.
246. Missakian & Hldaky, supra note 243.
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finance litigation and desegregation as vehicles for achieving equal educational
opportunity. However, this debate has so far failed to take account of a central
insight of this Essay: that because of political realities, it is .likely that
desegregation will have to be purchased where it is pursued. This insight and
the consequent trade-off between reducing racial isolation and achieving
systemic school finance reform have important implications when the goals of
each effort and the constituencies each seeks to help are different. Because
remedying desegregation and enacting school finance reform both rely on state
money, in a world of limited resources, a decision to pursue one vision of equal
educational opportunity may mean shortchanging the other.
A. Buying Desegregation
Scholars have only recently begun to explore the influence of race on
school finance reform. So far, the literature has largely concentrated on how the
race of plaintiffs challenging a school finance system can affect their chances
of success or failure both in the courts and legislative arena.247 Connecticut's
experience suggests a second way in which race can influence school finance
reform: When racial isolation necessitates desegregation litigation, the
desegregation is likely to be purchased, and where resources are limited, may
come to compete with funds needed to fix an inequitable or inadequate system
of school finance.
The political realities that shaped the legislature's response to Sheff are
hardly unique to Connecticut. Popular opposition to mandatory measures has
arisen in other northern and western states where courts ordered busing rather
than leaving the remedy to the legislature. For example, in California, the only
other state where a court found de facto segregation of a city's public schools
unconstitutional,248 the voters responded to the court's busing order by passing
a constitutional amendment restricting California courts from interpreting the
state constitution to be more permissive than the federal Constitution in
allowing the use of busing to achieve school desegregation. 249 In Boston, white
residents resisted court-ordered busing more violently, leading to what is
perhaps the most notorious chapter in the history of northern school
desegregation. 250 By contrast, other northern courts turned straight to expensive
voluntary plans in part to avoid predictable popular resistance.25 1 As one
247. See Ryan, supra note 11.
248. The city was Los Angeles. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
249. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the provision in Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
250. See generally J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES
OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985) (providing a comprehensive account of Boston's desegregation
experience, including the backlash against the busing remedy).
251. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468, 470 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (describing large-scale
voluntary program implemented in the Buffalo public schools); Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Sch.
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scholar has observed, the battle over money "does not begin to match, in
intensity or violence, the controversy caused by desegregation.
252
Given the movement away from mandatory desegregation among voters,
legislatures, and courts, Connecticut's experience after Sheff seems a strong
predictor of how efforts to reduce racial isolation will play out in the future, if
such efforts continue. 253 Of course, some factors will always distinguish one
state from the next. For example, Chief Justice Peters' retirement and the
legislature's knowledge that compliance motions would be heard by a more
conservative supreme court might have reduced the impact of the court's
mandate in Sheff254 However, given the strength of the opposition to busing
and redistricting, it is hard to imagine the legislature having adopted these
measures under any circumstances.
In fact, the General Assembly's response to Sheff is consistent with a
broader historical trend in desegregation litigation away from mandating
25integration and toward relying on remedial funding.  In Milliken I, the
Supreme Court held that courts could not order interdistrict urban/suburban
busing where the suburbs did not themselves engage in de jure segregation. 256
In so doing, it ensured that the line between urban and suburban schools
remained sacrosanct. A few years later in Milliken II, the Court approved a
desegregation plan that required the state of Michigan to help fund remedial
and compensatory education programs for racially isolated Detroit students.
257
In this way, desegregation at the federal level became as much about spending
money as moving students. The legislature's response to Sheff follows this
trend-a trend that risks pitting desegregation against school finance reform in
the competition for state funds.
B. Competing Approaches to Realizing Equal Educational Opportunity
That the remedies to Horton and Sheff both focused on increasing state
Dist. of Phila., 374 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977), affd, 390 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1978) (implementing a
voluntary desegregation plan for the Philadelphia public schools).
252. Ryan, supra note 7, at 566.
253. As consent orders from federal desegregation cases are being dismantled, see supra note 3, the
question is whether more desegregation suits will be brought in state court. In Professor Ryan's view,
the fact that only two other states besides Connecticut (Hawaii and New Jersey) have an explicit
segregation clause is not an obstacle to pursuing desegregation under state constitutions, as in Sheff. He
contends that litigants could draw on state constitutions' education clauses to argue that an adequate
education is one that is free from racial and ethnic segregation. See id. at 549. However, one such effort
in New York recently failed. See Paynter v. New York, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003) (dismissing
complaint of students in the Rochester City School District (RCSD) who sued state officials claiming
they were being deprived of a "sound basic education" because of the concentration of poor and
minority students in RCSD on the grounds that the state had no responsibility, under the New York
Constitution, to change the demographic composition of student bodies).
254. See supra notes 179 & 180 and accompanying text.
255. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 261-62.
256. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
257. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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education funding should not obscure the differences in the suits' underlying
goals. While Horton, Sheff, and Johnson all sought to achieve equality of
educational opportunity, Connecticut's experience shows that they aimed to do
so in different ways and, to some extent, on behalf of different children.
In Horton v. Meskill, Wesley Horton understood his case as being aimed at
a fundamentally different problem than that which plagued the state's urban
schools. To Horton, who deliberately sought to keep Hartford from intervening
in his suit, Hartford's problem lay in its racial isolation. Later, as a member of
the Sheff litigation team, he and others sought to persuade the court that
achieving equality of educational opportunity would require integrating
Hartford's predominantly African-American and Latino student population
with white suburban students. By contrast, Canton students' deprivation of
equality of educational opportunity arose from the state's failure to provide
enough money to equalize educational spending across school districts. Canton
students lacked the resources of wealthier suburbs because the State over-relied
on local property taxes to fund education. Given the difference between the
problems underlying Horton and Sheff, it is not surprising that even though the
General Assembly's remedy for Horton was heavily weighted toward giving
needy urban students more funding, Sheff was still necessary to address
Hartford's racial isolation.
At the same time, it is also not surprising that Sheff failed to obviate the
need for Johnson v. Rowland, for just as Horton was not intended to reduce the
racial isolation of urban students, Sheff was never intended to reduce the State's
over-reliance on local property taxes to fund education. In criticizing the State's
failure to update and fix ECS, the Johnson suit was concerned with the fact that
municipalities were having to shoulder more of the burden for funding
education than the original formula would have required. 8 To the extent that
the Johnson school districts lacked the property wealth to support their existing
need, the Johnson plaintiffs argued, they were being denied equality of
educational opportunity.
While it may be difficult to sympathize with Johnson plaintiffs who came
from priority school districts and thus received supplemental state funds, it is
easier to understand the importance of fixing ECS for property-poor mill towns
that have not received extra money from Sheff, and whose achievement levels
are barely above those of urban districts. For mill town residents, school
finance litigation may be an effective way to ensure that the State fulfills its
constitutional obligation to provide equality of educational opportunity. It also
may be a useful way of guaranteeing enough funding for an adequate
258. Mattiello Interview, supra note 130 (stating that Johnson is "about a cost-sharing. It's an inter-
governmental issue between state and local."); see also BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 189, at 20
("Connecticut is more reliant on property taxation for funding K- 12 education than all other states in the
nation.")
Yale Law & Policy Review
education. As former Commissioner Sergi, a named defendant in Johnson,
admitted while still serving as commissioner, "I don't think there's any
question from where I sit that there would be some advantage to having
Johnson v. Rowland succeed in at least pushing the issue of adequacy."
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Ultimately, Sheff could not have been expected to prevent the need for
Johnson because-like Horton and Sheff-Sheff and Johnson were aimed at
different problems and sought to ensure equality of educational opportunity in
different ways. Indeed, far from supplanting school finance litigation as a way
of achieving equal educational opportunity, desegregation, insofar as it
involved spending money that otherwise could have been used to fix ECS,
appears to have made school finance litigation more pertinent. School finance
and desegregation litigation strive for different conceptions of equality of
educational opportunity, often on behalf of different constituencies; however,
because today's political realities make them both rely on increased state
funding to achieve their goals and state officials perceive them as competing
against each other, to pursue one is to impair the other.
The remaining question, then, is whether there is a way out of this trade-off.
Two theoretical solutions exist, but the prospects for both are bleak. The first is
to relieve one of the demands on state education dollars, for example by
reorienting the State's approach to desegregation away from high-cost
measures and toward a less expensive redistricting solution. Given the intensity
of the opposition to mandatory measures, this solution has no real hope.
The second would require either spending existing education resources
more efficiently or expanding the total pie of state resources available for
education to accommodate both visions of equal educational opportunity.
Expanding the pie requires political will and a strong economy. If Governor
Rowland's recent warnings about the effect of the Sheff settlement on general
education funding are any indication, such an expansion is extraordinarily
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unlikely. The current economic climate is surely a factor. Facing a $650
million budget shortfall, in February 2003 the General Assembly approved a
budget that cut $41 million of municipal aid.261 As the history of education
litigation from Horton to Sheff to Johnson shows, the legislature has rarely
acted on its own, without the impetus of a supreme court holding, to effect a
major improvement in equality of educational opportunity.262 It took both
259. Sergi Interview, supra note 21.
260. See Christopher Keating, State's Bond Rating Drops; Debts to Cost Millions More,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 3, 2003, at A l (describing "[tlhe state's worst fiscal crisis since 1991").
261. Don Stacom, Cities, Towns Feel Shortchanged, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 28, 2003, at B 1.
262. The notable exception is the passage of the Educational Enhancement Act in 1986, which
committed $300 million in new funding to equalize teacher salaries around the state. In then-
Commissioner of Education Gerald Tirozzi's view, this legislation was possible because "the stars were
aligned." Tirozzi Interview, supra note 20. Specifically, the combination of the publication of A Nation
at Risk and the fact that the state was flush with money catalyzed the legislation. Id.
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Horton and Sheff to force an apathetic General Assembly to confront the
problems of school finance inequity and segregation. With Johnson unable to
make it to trial because of financial troubles, it seems doubtful that the General
Assembly will independently find the will and resources to fix ECS in addition
to funding the Sheff settlement. 263 For now, at least, achieving meaningful
desegregation and school finance reform in Connecticut seems unlikely.
CONCLUSION
This Essay set out to understand why Connecticut has followed an
alternating path from school finance litigation, to desegregation, and back again
to school finance litigation, and what that unique path can teach us about the
relative merits of each approach and how they interact when pursued alongside
each other. Sheff became necessary even after a victorious school finance suit
because while Horton ended up providing increased resources for urban
schools, it could not solve the problem of racial isolation. For this reason,
Connecticut's experience suggests that to the extent that school finance
litigation remains focused exclusively on dollars, it may never be a panacea for
the educational ills of a state that is segregated by race and class.
Later, Johnson became necessary even after the plaintiffs' victory in Sheff
in part because of how political exigencies shaped the Sheff remedy. Because
the State responded by spending millions on voluntary integration and grants to
improve the quality of education, in a world of limited state education dollars,
the Sheff remedy came to compete with the State's ability to fix its distorted
school finance formula. Thus, rather than helping to relieve the problem
underlying the Johnson complaint-the State's over-reliance on local property
taxes to fund education-it only exacerbated it. Connecticut's experience thus
points to an unexpected and indirect way in which race can influence school
finance reform. Moreover, it suggests that the two approaches to realizing
equality of educational opportunity, which chase after different goals, may
come to clash in a world of finite resources and limited political will.
We have also seen that court cases can play a pivotal role in pushing an
intransigent state legislature to act to correct inequities of which it was already
aware and that political exigencies can transform a constitutional mandate once
the legislature is given an opportunity to fashion a remedy. This Essay further
reveals the role that economic and budgetary constraints can play in
determining the scope of a remedy, and the difficulty of cash-strapped school
districts trying to fund their own school finance lawsuit.
Ultimately, Connecticut's experience reaffirms that desegregation and
school finance litigation are deeply connected, but not just as part of a historical
263. Some legislators have balked at the $135 million cost of the Sheff settlement alone. See Frahm,
supra note 163.
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narrative where one method ceded to the other.264 In Connecticut, the two
methods have been interwoven through three decades of litigation, with each
method simultaneously highlighting the importance of the other and competing
with it for limited state dollars. As advocates of equal educational opportunity
develop innovative litigation strategies that combine claims for more dollars
and less racial isolation, they must remain attuned to the complex and
unexpected ways in which their claims may interact. When Connecticut's three
cases are viewed together, they provide a cautionary tale. Considered
individually, however, each case holds out promise for what can be achieved
through the relentless pursuit of equal educational opportunity in its many
forms.
264. See supra text accompanying notes I & 2 (recounting the historical transition from
desegregation to school finance litigation in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
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